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1. Introduction
“Managers are conductors of an input orchestra [...] Just as a poor conductor can lead
to a cacophony rather than a symphony, one might expect poor management to lead to
discordant production operations.”
– Chad Syverson, What Determines Productivity (2011)
The enormous variation in firm performance has become a focus of empirical and
theoretical interest throughout the social sciences, including economics. Recent empirical
studies have exploited the increasing availability of information on managerial practices
and managers’ characteristics to establish a strong connection with firm—as well as
country—productivity and other dimensions of performance. More specifically, Bloom
and Van-Reenen (2010), Bloom et al. (2013), Bloom et al. (2016b) and Guiso and Rustichini
(2011) among others, have established that better managers and managerial practices
lead to better firm performance. We believe the next question is what happens when
managers move from one firm to another. Does a firm hiring a good manager improve
its performance? If yes is it due to the manager simply being a good manager or is there
some valuable knowledge the manager has acquired and successfully diffused to the new
firm? The objective of this paper is to provide answers to these questions.
If sizeable knowledge diffusion happens via the mobility of managers we should, for
example, expect that policies improving managerial practices in some firms will spill-over
to other firms. In this respect, within the urban economics literature on spill-overs, there
are some contributions showing how job hopping help sustain the competitiveness of
local industry clusters like Silicon Valley.1 Recent contributions to the international
trade literature also highlight knowledge diffusion: Artopoulos et al. (2013) explain
how the diffusion of business practices from export pioneers to followers can lead to
sustained export growth, while Atkin et al. (2016) document a knowledge flow between
intermediaries and foreign buyers leading to improvement in product quality. However,
answering these questions is also difficult: First, it is challenging to separate a manager’s
intrinsic capabilities from the knowledge and abilities she has learned in previous firms.
Second, it is empirically difficult to show that such acquired knowledge and abilities
impact current firm performance.
In order to overcome the first challenge we draw on information related to specific ac-
tivities the manager was involved in when working for previous firms. More specifically,
we use information on whether the manager has worked in the past for firms exporting to
1Fallick et al. (2006) argue that job hopping is important in computer clusters because it facilitates
the reallocation of talent and resources toward firms with superior innovations. Using detailed data on
labor mobility, they find higher rates of job-hopping for college-educated men in Silicon Valley’s computer
industry than in other computer clusters.
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a specific destination country or a specific product. Our data is rich enough to allow con-
trolling for both manager and firm unobservables and wash out any time-invariant ability
of the manager as well as overall firm performance. To tackle the second challenge we
then relate this destination-specific or product-specific measure of acquired knowledge
to the current firm trade performance in these specific destinations or products. In doing
so we deal with the endogeneity of hiring in two complementary ways. First, we explore
the differential performance of firms with and without managers with specific export
experience in the wake of an exogenous event: the sudden end of the Angolan civil war
in 2002. Second, we draw on the panel nature of the data and use information on whether
the firm had managers with destination-specific or product-specific export experience
3 years prior to evaluating firm-performance in those destinations or products. We
further refine our analysis by looking at different types of managers (general, production,
financial and sales) and show how specific export experience interacts with the degree of
product differentiation and/or the financial vulnerability of a firm’s products as well as
with rising import competition from China.
We find that the export experience gained by managers in previous firms leads their
current firm towards higher export performance, and commands a sizable wage premium
for the manager. Moreover, export knowledge is decisive when it is market-specific:
managers with experience related to markets (where by markets we mean destinations
or products) served by their current firm receive an even higher wage premium; firms
are more likely to enter markets where their managers have experience; exporters are
more likely to stay in those markets, and their sales are on average higher. While it
is reasonable to expect managers to learn valuable skills from their previous jobs and
transfer them, the magnitudes we find are stark. Managers’ export experience is a
first-order feature in the data explaining more variation in firm export performance than
size and productivity.
At the same time, we show that the experience premium accrued by different types
of managers (general, production, financial and sales) aligns with a knowledge diffusion
story. More specifically, we show that financial managers enjoy a basic export experience
wage premium but no robust product- or destination-specific experience wage premium.
General and production managers receive both a product- and a destination-specific ex-
perience premium but little or no basic experience premium. Sales managers benefit from
a destination-specific experience premium while general managers get the largest premia
in most cases. Furthermore, we find market-specific experience to be more valuable in
terms of trade performance to firms selling products that are more differentiated and/or
financially vulnerable while at the same time experience seems to help some firms coping
with increasing import competition from China.
Our analysis stands on three solid pillars: reliable data on one country (Portugal)
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covering the universe of firms and their workers for several years, including rich in-
formation on the characteristics of both; the possibility of tracking workers—and in
particular managers—as they move from firm to firm; a research design that accounts
for unobserved heterogeneity, omitted variables, and, more broadly, endogeneity.
Our work relates to a number of strands in the literature. First, we contribute to the
above cited empirical literature on management by showing how managers can diffuse
knowledge and good practice across firms. Second, our work relates to the literature
looking at the relationship between trade and tasks (Blinder, 2006, Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2008). Such literature suggests that the complexity of the tasks involved in the
different stages of production process (design, manufacturing of parts, assembly, R&D,
marketing, commercialization, etc.) is key to understand recent trends in international
trade. Managers are different from other workers and likely to be particularly important
for trade activity because they are responsible for the most complex tasks within a firm.
Third, the role played by managers’ mobility across firms in our analysis contributes to
the recent debate about the channels via which knowledge diffusion takes place (Balsvik,
2011, Parrotta and Pozzoli, 2012, Mion and Opromolla, 2014).2 Last, but not least,
our wage analysis contributes to the literature devoted to explaining the determinants
of managers’ pay (Gabaix and Landier, 2008, Guadalupe and Wulf, 2008), and to the
literature that studies the internal organization of the firm and how this relates to a firm’s
characteristics such as export status (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012, Caliendo et al.,
2015).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. In
Section 3, after defining some key variables, we show raw data evidence positively asso-
ciating a manager’s export experience with his/her wage and firm export performance.
These descriptive results are confirmed by the econometric testing of Sections 4 and 5.
Section 6 concludes and provides directions for further research. Additional details about
the data are provided in the Appendix. The Tables Appendix provides complementary
Tables.
2. Data
Our data combines information resulting from two panel datasets: international
trade data at the firm-country-product level and matched employer-employee panel
2More specifically, we expand upon own research in Mion and Opromolla (2014) by considering
different types of experience, different types of managers, the role of financial vulnerability and product
differentiation as well as rising import competition from China. We also provide here further evidence
on the causal impact of knowledge diffusion by exploring the differential performance of firms with and
without managers with specific export experience in the wake of an exogenous event: the sudden end of
the Angolan civil war in 2002.
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data. International trade data are collected by Statistics Portugal and—besides small
adjustments—aggregate to the official total exports and imports of Portugal. For the
purpose of this research, we use data on export transactions only, aggregated at the
firm-destination-product-year level, for the period 1995-2005.
Employer-employee data come from Quadros de Pessoal (henceforth, QP), a dataset
collected by the Ministry of Employment, drawing on a compulsory annual census of all
firms in Portugal that employ at least one worker. Reported data cover the firm itself,
as well as each of its workers. Each firm and each worker entering the database are
assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying number which we use to follow firms and
workers over time. Currently, the data set collects data on about 350,000 firms and 3
million employees. As for the trade data, we were able to gain access to information
from 1995 to 2005. We describe the two datasets and their merging in more detail in the
Appendix.
The dataset allows to follow workers—especially managers—as they move from firm
to firm; moreover, knowing firms’ trade status in each year, allows the identification
of workers’ export experience. This is possible thanks to an exhaustive coverage of
firms, their workers, and their trade activity as well as a high degree of reliability. The
richness of the data also makes it possible to control for a wealth of both worker and firm
characteristics as well as for unobserved heterogeneity by means of various fixed effects.
We provide in the Appendix more information about the way we have constructed some
of the covariates.
We perform two complementary analyses. Because of our definitions of export expe-
rience, the analyses have been performed over the period 1996-2005. In Section 4, we
estimate a wage equation to identify the existence of a wage premium for workers’—and
in particular for managers’—export experience and its refinements: product and destina-
tion export experience. We subsequently show how premia are accrued by different types
of managers (general, production, etc.) to further corroborate our story. In Section 5, we
quantify the impact of the presence of managers with either destination or product export
experience on a firm’s trade performance. At the end of that section, we strengthen the
causal interpretation of our results by exploiting a natural experiment—the end of the
civil war in Angola. We also show how export experience interacts with the degree of
product differentiation and/or the financial vulnerability of a firm’s products3 as well as
3The data on product differentiation comes from Rauch (1999) while data on financial vulnerability is
taken from Manova et al. (2015). More specifically, we use for the former information on whether products
are neither sold on an organized exchanged nor reference priced (liberal version) while for the latter we
use the external financial dependence measure.
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Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics, Wage Sample, 2005
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Worker-level
Hourly Wage (log) 1.351 0.518 436,351
Age (Years) 38.206 10.695 436,351
Education (Years) 7.449 3.586 436,351
Tenure (Years) 10.043 9.277 436,351
Manager (0/1) 0.067 0.250 436,351
Manag. X Export Exp. (0/1) 0.015 0.122 436,351
Manag. X Matched Dest. Export Exp. (0/1) 0.012 0.109 436,351
Manag. X Matched Prod. Export Exp. (0/1) 0.011 0.104 436,351
Current firm-level
Firm Size (log) 2.339 1.142 25,681
Firm Productivity (log) 10.480 0.908 25,681
Firm Age (log) 2.461 0.816 25,681
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.024 0.154 25,681
At Least One Manag. (0/1) 0.274 0.446 25,681
At Least One Manag. with Export Exp. (0/1) 0.083 0.276 25,681
At Least One Manag. with Matched Dest. Export Exp. (0/1) 0.050 0.218 25,681
At Least One Manag. with Matched Prod. Export Exp. (0/1) 0.046 0.209 25,681
Previous firm-level
Firm Size (log) 2.125 1.164 4,583
Firm Productivity (log) 6.740 5.016 4,583
Notes: This Table shows summary statistics, relative to 2005, for a subset of worker-level and firm-level variables used
in the regressions of Section 4 and 5. Statistics refer to observations for which all covariates in the wage regression
sample of Section 4 are jointly available. Firm-level variables subdivide into those relative to the worker’s current firm
and to those relative to the previous firm. Variable names followed by "(0/1)" refer to dummy variables. In the last
column, "N" refers to the number of workers for worker-level variables, and to the number of (current or previous)
firms for firm-level variables.
with rising competition due to Chinese imports.4 In doing so we restrict the sample to
firms with at least one employed manager.5 Section 3 provides some raw data evidence
that is consistent with the results of both analyses.
4We construct a measure of increase in Chinese import penetration that is both product and market
specific along the lines of Autor et al. (2014). More specifically we consider the ratio between: (i) the
change in the value of imports from China between 1995 and year t ∈ [1996, 2005] for a given Isic product
in a given market; (ii) the value of apparent consumption (imports plus production minus exports) for
a given Isic product in a given market and year t. We use the CEPII (Centre d’Etude Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales) trade and production dataset to compute such a measure. In our analysis
a market is sometimes a group of countries and, when constructing apparent consumption for a given
market, we do not consider imports and exports among countries belonging to the same market.
5The sample of firms is thus different in the two analyses; below we refer to the two sample as "wage
sample" and "trade performance sample". The majority of firms in the wage sample lacks a (employed)
manager. To identify managers in the data we need the person(s) running the firm to receive a wage:
this can be a self-employed owner or a third person employed by the owner(s). Our trade performance
analysis is thus representative of larger and more organizationally structured firms. Firms with at least
one manager represent (in 2005) 53.6 percent of exporting firms, account for 91.8 percent of exports, and
61.5 percent of employment of the Portuguese manufacturing industry.
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Table 1 reports summary statistics, for 2005, of the main worker-level and firm-level—
both for the worker’s current and previous firm—variables used in our wage estimations
and referring to observations for which all covariates are jointly available. The top panel
of Table 1 indicates that, in 2005, our sample includes 436,351 workers, with an average
(log) hourly wage of 1.35 euros, an average age of 38.2 years, an average education of 7.45
years, and an average firm tenure of 10 years.6 The middle panel of Table 1 shows that
these workers are employed by 25,681 firms, and reports the average firm (log) size, (log)
productivity, (log) age, and the share of foreign-owned firms (2.4 percent). Finally, the
bottom panel provides the average (log) size and productivity of the 4,583 firms previously
employing the workers in our sample.
Table 2: Number of Exporters and Average Exports, by Country-group, Trade Sample, 2005
Markets
IT-UK Other Other
Variable Spain FR-DE EU OECD CPLP China ROW
# of Exporting firms 1,696 1,711 1,285 1,401 1,097 204 1,227
—with Export Exp. 838 833 644 711 558 127 651
—with Matched Dest. Export Exp. 717 736 524 624 455 57 547
Avg. Exports 2,322 4,046 1,454 1,244 301 596 950
Notes: This Table shows the number of firms exporting to each of the seven markets we consider and their average exports (in
thousands euros) for the 2005 sample year. The number of exporters further subdivides into those having at least one manager
with export experience and those having at least one manager with matched (destination) export experience. Statistics refers
to observations for which all covariates in the trade performance analysis sample of Section 5 are jointly available. CPLP is the
Portuguese acronym for the Community of Portuguese Language Countries.
Tables 2 and 3 report selected summary statistics—for 2005—referring to the trade
performance sample. In Section 5 we model a firm’s entry and continuation into a specific
destination, or into a specific product market, m, and analyze both the probability to start
and continue exporting as well as the value of exports conditional on entry/continuation.
When considering destinations, we partition countries into seven groups: Spain (the
most frequent destination), other top 5 export destination countries (Italy, UK, France,
and Germany), other EU countries, OECD countries not belonging to the EU, countries
belonging to the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP in Portuguese),
China, and the rest of the World. Table 2 shows, for each of the seven destinations, the
number of exporting firms and average exports (in thousand euros). When considering
products, we partition markets into 29 Isic rev.2 groups. The largest groups, in terms
of total exports, are 384 "Transport equipment", 383 "Electrical machinery apparatus,
6Carneiro et al. (2012) find that average (log) hourly earnings (in real Euros) are 1.34 for men and 1.13
for women, in the 1986-2005 period. Workers’ tenure and wage are described in the Appendix.
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Table 3: Number of Exporters and Average Exports, Seven largest product groups, Trade Sample, 2005
Markets
Textiles Wearing Paper Industrial Machinery Electrical Transport
Variable apparel products chemicals exc. electrical machinery equipment
# of Exporting firms 515 508 316 368 739 324 228
—with Export Exp. 272 205 195 225 393 187 143
—with Matched Prod. Export Exp. 194 149 122 152 327 135 92
Avg. Exports 1,940 2,125 2,813 2,593 2,389 5,779 10,940
Notes: This Table shows the number of firms exporting to each of the seven largest, in terms of total exports, product groups in our sample,
and their average exports (in thousands euros) for the 2005 sample year. The number of exporters further subdivides into those having at
least one manager with export experience and those having at least one manager with matched (product) export experience. Statistics refers to
observations for which all covariates in the trade performance analysis sample of Section 5 are jointly available. The number and full titles of the
product groups are 384 "Transport equipment", 383 "Electrical machinery apparatus, appliances and supplies" 382 "Machinery except electrical"
322 "Wearing apparel, except footwear" 321 "Textiles" 351 "Industrial chemicals", and 341 "Paper and paper products". See the Appendix for
details on the product definition.
appliances and supplies" 382 "Machinery except electrical" 322 "Wearing apparel, except
footwear" 321 "Textiles" 351 "Industrial chemicals", and 341 "Paper and paper products"
Table 3 shows, for each of the seven largest product groups, the number of exporting
firms and average exports (in thousand euros).
3. Main definitions and evidence from raw data
In this Section we draw the distinction between managers and non-managers, we de-
fine export experience as well as its two refinements: experience in a destination and
experience in a product. We also show raw data evidence on the existence of an export
experience wage premium for managers, and on the impact of managers with export
experience on a firm’s trade performance.
3.1 Managers
In our analysis, we partion workers into managers and non-managers. As it is effectively
captured by the quote of Syverson (2011) at the beginning of the paper, managers are
responsible for strategic decisions taken within the firm including the organization of
the firm, planning, and the shaping of technical, scientific and administrative methods
7
or processes.7
In practice, we identify managers using a (compulsory) classification of workers,
according to eight hierarchical levels, defined by the Portuguese law (Decreto Lei 121/78
of July 2nd 1978). Classification is based on the tasks performed and skill requirements,
and each level can be considered as a layer in a hierarchy defined in terms of increasing
responsibility and task complexity. Managers are defined as the workers belonging to
one of the top two hierarchical levels: “Top management” and “Middle management”;
non-manager are workers belonging to lower hierarchical levels. Table 1 shows that, in
the wage sample in 2005, 6.7 percent of the workers are managers and 27.4 percent of the
firms have at least one manager.
We then take a deeper look into the professional status of the manager by analysing
the exact occupation within a firm. Using the four digit ISCO classification in Quadros
de Pessoal, we look at the professional status of the managers specifically focusing on
directors, the category to which the vast majority of managers belong to. We end up
with 4 groups: general managers, production managers, financial managers and sales
managers. We lump managers covering other occupations into a fifth group (other
managers).
Figure 1 confirms that the distinction between managers and non-managers is rele-
vant when considering a firm’s trade activity. A large literature tries to identify and
explain a wage premium paid by exporting firms (Frias et al., 2009, Munch and Skaksen,
2008, Schank et al., 2007). Martins and Opromolla (2012), show that Portugal is not
an exception to this robust empirical finding. Figure 1 shows that the exporter wage
premium seems to come essentially from managers. More specifically, Figure 1 shows
the kernel density of the log hourly wage distribution in our 2005 wage sample, both
for managers and non-managers, broken down by firm export status (exporters and
non-exporters). The wage density referring to managers employed by exporting firms
clearly lies to the right of the one for managers employed by non-exporters. The evidence
7The distinction between managers and non-managers is relevant in light of recent developments in the
international trade literature: Antràs et al. (2006) and Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) explicitly focus
on the formation of teams of workers in a globalized economy, and emphasize that the key distinction
between managers and non-managers is that the former are in charge of complex tasks. Managers are
different from other workers because they are responsible for the most complex tasks—those that are
crucial for international trade performance—within a firm. Second, managers are “special” when it comes
to doing business in foreign markets because they are in charge of marketing and commercialization
activities (which are not necessarily more complex) such as, for example, setting-up distribution channels,
finding and establishing relationships with foreign suppliers, setting up marketing activities directed at
finding and informing new buyers, and building a customer base. Arkolakis (2010) and Eaton et al.
(2015) stress the key role of search and marketing costs in international trade and provide evidence of the
importance of the continuous “search and learning about foreign demand” problem that firms face when
selling abroad. At the same time, Araujo et al. (2016) show the importance of trust-building in repeated
interactions between sellers and buyers in an international market.
8
Figure 1: Wage density for managers and non-managers, by firm export status, 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows the kernel density of the (log) hourly wage distribution in 2005 for managers (left panel) and non-
managers (right panel), broken down by firm export status (exporters and non-exporters). Statistics refers to observations for which
all covariates in the wage regression sample of Section 4 are jointly available. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width is the
Stata default one.
for non-managers is instead much weaker.
3.2 Export experience
Managers are not all alike: their set of skills and knowledge can be tightly connected to
the experience they faced along their careers. In particular, only some managers have
the chance to be involved in export activities. To the extent that experience acquired in
exporting firms substantially improves the capacities and skills of a manager it should
correspond to a wage premium. Furthermore, such experience is potentially valuable to
all firms, but in particular to exporters, who might expect an improvement of their trade
performance.
We exploit the matched employer-employee feature of our dataset to track workers
over time: for each firm-year pair, we identify the subset of (currently employed) workers
that have previously worked in a different firm. Moreover, we exploit the trade dataset to
single-out those workers that were employed in the past by an exporting firm. We define
such workers, and in particular managers, as having export experience.8
8Table 1 indicates that about 23 percent of the managers (0.015/0.067) have export experience, while 8.3
percent of firms—i.e. 30% of the firms with at least one manager—have at least one manager with export
experience.
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To gain further insights we consider in our framework two related refinements of
export experience. The first refinement is market specific export experience, where a
market indicates either a destination d or a product p. The former refers to one of the
seven markets listed in Section 2 while the latter to one of the 29 product groups defined
using the Isic rev2 classification (see the Appendix). We define a worker as having
destination d-specific export experience if he/she has export experience and destination
d was among the destinations served by one of the worker’s previous employers during
the period of time the worker was employed there. Symmetrically, we define a worker as
having product p-specific export experience if he/she has export experience and product
p was among the product exported by one of the worker’s previous employers during the
period of time the worker was employed there. The second refinement is matched export
experience. We define a worker as having matched export experience in a destination if
he/she has export experience and has market d-specific export experience in at least one
of the markets to which the current employing firm is actually exporting. Moreover, a
worker can have matched export experience in a product group when he/she has export
experience and has product p-specific export experience in at least one of the products
the current employing firm is actually exporting.
Figures 2 to 5 provide raw wage data evidence supporting the idea that the distinction
between managers with and without export experience is relevant when considering a
firm’s international activity. Furthermore they also highlight the importance of destina-
tion and product experience. More specifically Figures 2 and 3 show the wage density for
managers with export experience dominates the one corresponding to managers without
experience. At the same time, Figure 2 (3) suggests the presence of an additional wage
premium for destination-specific (product-specific) matched export experience over basic
experience. Furthermore, Figures 4 and 5 indicate the above holds for all of the five
categories of managers we consider.
3.3 Export experience and trade performance
Figures 6 to 9 analyze more directly the correlation between the presence of managers
with experience in a firm and that firm’s export performance. More specifically they
focus on two export performance margins, namely the probability to start and probability
to continue exporting in a given destination d (Figures 6 and 7) or a given product p
(Figures 8 and 9). We consider three categories of firms: those without managers with
export experience, those with at least one manager with export experience, and those
with at least one manager with specific (destination or product) export experience. It
can be readily appreciated that in all instances the presence of managers with export
experience within a firm is associated to a higher probability to start/continue exporting
10
while at the same time having at least one manager with specific export experience is
associated with an even higher probability. This is by no means a proof of causality but
certainly a strong feature of the data one needs to address.
Figure 2: Wage density for managers by export experience in a destination, 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows the kernel density of the (log) hourly wage distribution in 2005 for managers, broken down by degree of
export experience (in a destination). Statistics refers to observations for which all covariates in the wage regression sample of Section
4 are jointly available. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width is the Stata default one.
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Figure 3: Wage density for managers by export experience in a product, 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows the kernel density of the (log) hourly wage distribution in 2005 for managers, broken down by degree of
export experience (in a product). Statistics refers to observations for which all covariates in the wage regression sample of Section 4
are jointly available. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width is the Stata default one.
Figure 4: Wage density of managers distinguishing by: manager type and export experience (in
a destination), 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows the kernel density of the (log) hourly wage distribution in 2005 for managers, broken down by manager
type and degree of export experience (in a destination). Statistics refers to observations for which all covariates in the wage regression
sample of Section 4 are jointly available. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width is the Stata default one.
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Figure 5: Wage density of managers distinguishing by: manager type and export experience (in
a product), 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows the kernel density of the (log) hourly wage distribution in 2005 for managers, broken down by manager
type and degree of export experience (in a product). Statistics refers to observations for which all covariates in the wage regression
sample of Section 4 are jointly available. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width is the Stata default one.
Figure 6: Export entry rate, experience in a destination, 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows entry rates, defined as the ratio between the number of firms starting to export in destination d at time
t and the number of firms not exporting to destination d at time t-1, for each destination in 2005, for three groups of firms: those
that have no managers with export experience at time t, those that have at least one manager with export experience at time t, and
those that have at least one manager with specific export experience at time t. CPLP is the Portuguese acronym for the Community
of Portuguese Language Countries.
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Figure 7: Export continuation rate, experience in a destination, 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows continuation rates, defined as the share of firms continuing to export to destination d at time t among those
firms that were already exporting to destination d at time t, for each destination in 2005, for three groups of firms: those that have no
managers with export experience at time t, those that have at least one manager with export experience at time t, and those that have
at least one manager with specific export experience at time t. CPLP is the Portuguese acronym for the Community of Portuguese
Language Countries.
Figure 8: Export entry rate density, experience in a product, 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows kernel densities for entry rates, defined as the ratio between the number of firms starting to export product
p at time t and the number of firms not exporting product p at time t-1, for each product in 2005, for three groups of firms: those
that have no managers with export experience at time t, those that have at least one manager with export experience at time t, and
those that have at least one manager with specific export experience at time t. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width is
the Stata default one.
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Figure 9: Export continuation rate density, experience in a product, 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows kernel densities for continuation rates, defined as the share of firms continuing to export product p at time
t among those firms that were already exporting product p at time t, for each product in 2005, for three groups of firms: those that
have no managers with export experience at time t, those that have at least one manager with export experience at time t, and those
that have at least one manager with specific export experience at time t. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width is the Stata
default one.
4. Wage analysis
The first step towards establishing a relationship between the export experience brought
by managers into a firm and the firm’s trade performance consists in assessing whether
export experience corresponds to a wage premium. In this Section, we estimate a
Mincerian wage equation to show that managers with export experience (as defined
in Section 3) enjoy a sizeable wage premium. The premium is robust to controlling for
worker and firm fixed effects, previous firm observables, job-change patterns, as well as a
large set of worker and current firm time-varying observables. Moreover, managers with
experience in one (or more) of the current destinations reached or products exported
by their firm—i.e. matched destination- or product-specific export experience—enjoy
an even higher wage premium.9 These results confirm previous evidence in Mion and
Opromolla (2014) for destination-specific experience and paint a new but similar portrait
for product-specific experience.
9See Section 3 for the definition of specific export experience.
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We further enrich the analysis by looking at the experience premia accrued by different
types of managers (general, production, financial and sales) and find results in line
with a knowledge diffusion story. More specifically, we show that financial managers
enjoy a basic export experience premium but no robust product- or destination-specific
experience premium. General and production managers receive both a product- and
a destination-specific experience premium but little or no basic experience premium.
Sales managers benefit from a destination-specific experience premium while general
managers get the largest premia in most cases. Crucially, we find little evidence of a
wage premium for non-managers, which is the reason why in the trade performance
analysis of Section 5 we focus on managers only. These results add the evidence coming
from raw wage data shown in the previous Section.
There are caveats in our analysis as well as alternative explanations for the existence
of a premium that do not involve the diffusion of valuable export-specific knowledge by
managers. Though, such alternative explanations are at odds with the existence of an
additional wage premium for specific export experience and, as we will show later on,
potentially imply our premia are actually under-estimated. We discuss these issues in
more detail in Section 4.3.
4.1 Econometric model
Workers are indexed by i, current employing firms by f , previous employing firms by p,
and time by t. Each worker i is associated at time t to a unique current employing firm
f and a unique previous employing firm p. The baseline wage equation we estimate is:
wit = β0 + β1Managerit + Mobility′itΓM + (Mobilityit ×Managerit)′ ΓMm+
+β2Experienceit + β3 (Experienceit ×Managerit) +
+β4Matched_Experienceit + β5 (Matched_Experienceit ×Managerit) +
+I′itΓI + P
′
ptΓP + C
′
ftΓC + ηi + ηf + ηt + εit,
(1)
where wit is the (log) hourly wage of worker i in year t, Managerit is a dummy indicating
whether worker i is a manager at time t, the vector Mobilityit contains a set of dummies
taking value one from the year t a worker changes employer for the 1st, 2nd,..time,
Experienceit and Matched_Experienceit are dummies indicating whether worker i has,
respectively, export experience and matched (destination or product; we estimate two
separate regressions) export experience at time t, the vector Iit stands for worker i
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time-varying observables,10 the vectors Ppt and Cft refer to, respectively, the previous
and current employing firm observables,11 ηi (ηf ) are individual (firm) fixed effects and
ηt are time dummies.
The key parameters in our analysis are β2 + β3, i.e., the wage premium corresponding
to export experience for a manager, and β4 + β5, i.e., the extra premium corresponding to
matched export experience for a manager. β2 and β4 indicate, respectively, the premium
related to export experience and matched export experience for a non-manager. Mobility
of workers across firms is needed, according to our definition, to acquire export experi-
ence: Experienceit=1 if worker i has, among his/her previous employers, an exporting
firm while Matched_Experienceit=1 further requires the current employing firm to be
exporting: (i) one or more of the products previous employers were exporting (experience
in a product regressions); (ii) in at least one of the markets to which previous employers
were exporting (experience in a destination regressions). In other words, identification of
export experience premia comes from workers moving across firms. To disentangle wage
variations due to mobility from those related to export experience we consider the set of
dummies Mobilityit. We further interact Mobilityit with manager status Managerit to
allow mobility to have a differential impact on managers and non-managers.
Mobilityit, Experienceit, and Matched_Experienceit, as well as their interaction with
manager status, thus define a difference-in-difference setting with two treatments (ac-
quiring export experience and eventually also matched export experience) and a control
group of workers (managers and non-managers) changing employer without acquiring
export experience.12
Equation (1) is first estimated without worker and firm fixed effects, then with firm
fixed effects and finally with both sets of fixed effects. In all three cases we consider
two specifications: with export experience only and with both export experience and
10A worker’s age, age squared, education, and tenure. See Section 2 and the Appendix for further
details.
11Previous firm observables are size, productivity, and a dummy indicating whether the current and
previous firms belong to the same industry or not. Current firm observables are size, productivity, share
of skilled workers, export status, age, foreign ownership, mean and standard deviation of both age and
education of managers, and industry-level exports. For previous firm variables, as well as for current
firm variables requiring knowledge of managers’ age and education, we add a set of dummies equal to
one whenever the data are missing, while recoding missing values to zero. Previous employing firm
information is not available for workers who enter the labor market in our time frame or workers who
always stay in the same firm. We do this to maximize exploitable information. When we then turn to the
trade performance analysis which is, as detailed above, representative of larger and more organizationally
structured firms we simply discard missing observations. We consider both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms in constructing previous employing firm variables. In specifications without fixed
effects we add NUTS3 location and Nace rev.1 2-digit dummies as further controls. See Section 2 and the
Appendix for further details.
12Our regression design is likely to actually underestimate the value of export experience. For example,
mobility dummies would absorb some of the effect of the export-related learning to the extent greater
knowledge leads managers to receive more job offers and hence move around more.
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matched export experience. As already indicated we present separate regressions Tables
for experience in a destination and experience in a product. Last but least when focusing
on the different types of managers we break down the Managerit dummy (and its
interactions with experience) into 5 categories (general, production, financial, sales and
other). All our specifications are estimated with OLS and we deal high-dimensional fixed
effects building on the full Gauss-Seidel algorithm proposed by Guimarães and Portugal
(2010). See the Appendix for further details.
4.2 Results
Table 4 and 5 report the estimated export experience premia obtained from the different
variants of (1) both for manager and non-managers. More specifically in Table 4 we
consider wage regressions with basic experience and experience in a destination while in
Table 5 we consider wage regressions with basic experience and experience in a product.
The two Tables also show the significance levels of the premia, along with values of the
F-statistics for managers’ premia and T-statistics for non-managers’ premia.13 Tables B-15
to B-20 in the Tables Appendix provide information on all the other covariates. Such
Tables show that coefficient signs and magnitudes are in line with previous research
based on Mincerian wage regressions, i.e., wages are: higher for managers, increasing
and concave in age, increasing in education and tenure, higher in larger, more productive,
foreign-owned and older firms, higher in firms with a larger share of skilled workers.
The overall picture coming out from Tables 4 and 5 can be summarized as follows:
Export experience does pay for a manager. Columns (1) to (3) in the two Tables14 point to
a premium in between 11.5% (no fixed effects) and 2.7% (worker and firm fixed effects).
The latter figure should be considered as extremely conservative because, due to the
presence of worker fixed effects, we are identifying that coefficient from workers who
are currently managers but were not managers in the past. Yet the 2.7% is economically
big representing about half of the premium (5.8%) for being a manager in the estimation
corresponding to column 3. At the same time the difference in the premium across
specifications do suggest that managers with export experience are “better managers”
and work for better paying firms. However, a premium remains when controlling for
both firm and worker time-invariant heterogeneity indicating that export experience
13Managers’ premia are obtained from sums of covariates’ coefficients in equation (1). Therefore,
their significance is tested with an F-statistic. Non-managers’ premia correspond instead to individual
coefficients in equation (1) and so the T-statistic is used.
14Note results are identical between the two Tables and rightly so.
18
Table 4: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a destination
Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export Experience Premia for Managers
Export Experience 0.115a 0.110a 0.027a 0.064a 0.042a 0.013c
(870.8) (859.3) (27.4) (103.4) (50.3) (3.5)
Destination-Specific Exp. Experience 0.061a 0.089a 0.017a
(100.3) (230.1) (9.7)
Export Experience Premia for non-Managers
Export Experience 0.006a 0.014a -0.003c 0.022a 0.010a -0.003
(7.6) (17.0) (-1.7) (21.8) (10.6) (-1.1)
Destination-Specific Exp. Experience -0.028a 0.007a -0.003
(-25.4) (6.5) (-1.0)
Observations 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Worker controls X X X X X X
Firm (current and past) controls X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Worker FE X X
Notes: This Table reports export experience premia from the OLS estimation of several variants of the mincerian
wage equation (1). The dependent variable is a worker’s (log) hourly wage in euros. Export experience and
matched (destination) export experience are dummies. See Section 3 for the definition of a manager and the export
experience (and its refinements). Estimations include a number of covariates whose coefficients and standard errors
are reported in the Tables Appendix. Worker-year covariates include a worker’s age, age square, education, and
tenure. Current firm-time covariates include firm size, productivity, share of skilled workers, export status, age,
foreign ownership, mean and standard deviation of both age and education of managers, and industry-level exports.
Previous firm-time covariates include firm size, productivity, and a dummy indicating whether current and previous
employing firms industry affiliations coincide or not. See the Appendix for details on covariates. All specifications
include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE
2-digits) dummies. Robust F-statistics (t-statistics) for managers (non-managers) premia in parentheses: ap < 0.01,
bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
is not simply a proxy for managers’ unobserved ability and/or selection into higher
paying firms. Export experience is neither a trivial proxy for, as an example, a stronger
bargaining position of a manager moving out of a successful/productive firm. We do
control, in all specifications, for the size, productivity, and industry affiliation of the
manager’s previous firm. As shown in Tables B-15 to B-20 in the Tables Appendix
managers that come from more productive firms do earn a higher wage, but export
experience continues to be positively and significantly associated to a wage premium for
managers.
There is an additional premium for matched export experience for managers. Columns (4) to
(6) in Table 4 point to an additional premium accrued upon having destination-specific
experience, with respect to just having basic experience, in between 8.9% (firm fixed
effects) and 1.7% (worker and firm fixed effects). The corresponding figures for the
product-specific experience premium are 10% and 0.7% even though the latter fails to be
significant. Overall our findings suggest specific experience is an important feature of a
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Table 5: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a product
Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export Experience Premia for Managers
Export Experience 0.115a 0.110a 0.027a 0.072a 0.046a 0.022a
(870.8) (859.3) (27.4) (182.9) (79.0) (12.4)
Product-Specific Exp. Experience 0.061a 0.100a 0.007
(127.1) (360.9) (1.7)
Export Experience Premia for non-Managers
Export Experience 0.006a 0.014a -0.003c 0.013a 0.003a -0.008a
(7.6) (17.0) (-1.7) (13.0) (2.9) (-3.5)
Product-Specific Exp. Experience -0.012a 0.025a 0.006a
(-11.4) (22.7) (4.8)
Observations 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Worker controls X X X X X X
Firm (current and past) controls X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Worker FE X X
Notes: This Table reports export experience premia from the OLS estimation of several variants of the mincerian
wage equation (1). The dependent variable is a worker’s (log) hourly wage in euros. Export experience and
matched (product) export experience are dummies. See Section 3 for the definition of a manager and the
export experience (and its refinements). Estimations include a number of covariates whose coefficients and
standard errors are reported in the Tables Appendix. Worker-year covariates include a worker’s age, age square,
education, and tenure. Current firm-time covariates include firm size, productivity, share of skilled workers,
export status, age, foreign ownership, mean and standard deviation of both age and education of managers, and
industry-level exports. Previous firm-time covariates include firm size, productivity, and a dummy indicating
whether current and previous employing firms industry affiliations coincide or not. See the Appendix for details
on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain region
(NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. Robust F-statistics (t-statistics) for managers (non-managers)
premia in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
manager’s wage and are consistent with the hypothesis that managers diffuse valuable
export-related knowledge. While the existence of a premium for export experience is also
consistent with the diffusion of knowledge not uniquely related to exporting (e.g. R&D
skills, organizational practices, etc.) the additional premium for matched experience
does reinforce the view that export-specific knowledge is an important component of
the knowledge diffusion. Furthermore, our results suggest that such knowledge proves
to be very valuable when it is market-specific (product or destination).
There is limited evidence that export experience pays for non-managers. Non-managers
premia across Tables 4 and 5 are substantially smaller than those corresponding to
managers and less often significant. Given the key role of managers for export-specific
activities, the weaker evidence for premia among non-managers is consistent with
export experience entailing some valuable export-specific knowledge. Managers are
“special” because exporting requires successfully performing a number of complex
tasks and managers are the employees that are responsible for the most sophisticated
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tasks within a firm (e.g. Antràs et al., 2006, Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012).
Furthermore, managers are also different because they are in charge of marketing and
commercialization activities. As suggested by Arkolakis (2010) and Eaton et al. (2015),
searching for customers and suppliers and learning about their needs play a key role in
determining the success of a firm on the international market.
Table 6: Wage regression with different types of managers and export experience
Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export Experience Export Experience
General manager 0.078a 0.072a -0.001 0.116a 0.110a 0.020
(13.1) (12.9) (0.0) (29.1) (30.5) (1.2)
Production manager 0.053a 0.049a 0.018 0.041a 0.047a 0.025b
(11.2) (10.9) (1.5) (8.3) (12.1) (4.1)
Financial manager 0.056a 0.033c 0.092a 0.101a 0.090a 0.084a
(7.5) (3.0) (10.6) (28.4) (23.0) (13.4)
Sales manager -0.030 -0.024a 0.012 0.021 0.031 0.042c
(1.4) (1.1) (0.2) (1.0) (2.4) (3.3)
Destination-Specific Exp. Experience Product-Specific Exp. Experience
General manager 0.482a 0.428a 0.091a 0.432a 0.385a 0.058a
(298.1) (262.8) (15.4) (231.7) (208.7) (6.8)
Production manager 0.132a 0.158a 0.036b 0.169a 0.184a 0.026c
(56.1) (86.4) (5.4) (105.1) (132.7) (3.5)
Financial manager 0.156a 0.190a -0.015 0.110a 0.134a -0.006
(45.2) (73.7) (0.2) (24.8) (37.5) (0.8)
Sales manager 0.212a 0.221a 0.039c 0.164a 0.173a 0.000
(59.6) (76.6) (3.0) (44.0) (55.7) (0.0)
Observations 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826
R2 0.599 0.698 0.925 0.599 0.698 0.925
Worker controls X X X X X X
Firm (current and past) controls X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Worker FE X X
Notes: This Table reports export experience premia from the OLS estimation of several variants of the mincerian wage
equation (1). The dependent variable is a worker’s (log) hourly wage in euros. In specifications (1) to (3) both export
experience and destination-specific export experience are considered along with their interactions with dummies
corresponding to different types of managers. In specifications (4) to (6) both export experience and product-specific
export experience are considered along with their interactions with dummies corresponding to different types of
managers. See Section 3 for the definition of a manager, manager types and for export experience (and its refinements).
Estimations include a number of covariates whose coefficients and standard errors are reported in the Tables Appendix.
Worker-year covariates include a worker’s age, age square, education, and tenure. Current firm-time covariates
include firm size, productivity, share of skilled workers, export status, age, foreign ownership, mean and standard
deviation of both age and education of managers, and industry-level exports. Previous firm-time covariates include
firm size, productivity, and a dummy indicating whether current and previous employing firms industry affiliations
coincide or not. See the Appendix for details on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not
including fixed effects also contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. Robust F-statistics in
parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
Table 6 provides additional insights into the nature of export experience premia. More
specifically, we now split managers into several categories depending on their specific
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role within a firm and compute manager-type specific premia. In the left panel of Table6
we jointly consider experience and destination-specific experience and run estimations
with no fixed effects, firm fixed effects and both worker and firm fixed effects. In the
right panel of Table 6 we do the same for experience and product-specific experience. It
is important to note that the use of worker fixed effects is particularly conservative within
this context because, for example, premia referring to financial managers are identified
across workers who are currently financial managers but were either not a manager or a
different manager-type in the past.
Focusing on the most restrictive specifications – columns (3) and (6) – we find that
financial managers enjoy a basic export experience premium but no robust product- or
destination-specific experience premium. General and production managers receive both
a product- and a destination-specific experience premium but little or no basic experience
premium. Sales managers benefit from a destination-specific experience premium while
general managers get the largest premia in most cases. We believe these results aligns
with a knowledge diffusion story. More specifically, we believe that knowledge acquired
in ares like sales and production is more prone to be destination- or product-specific
while experience in financing activities should instead be of a more generic nature. As
for general managers they need to have expertise in all such areas and so they are likely
to hold overall more valuable knowledge to be diffused.
4.3 Endogeneity
Selection. For the estimated premia to have a causal interpretation we need, as is typi-
cally the case for Mincerian analyses, matching between firms and workers to be random
conditional on covariates in (1). If we consider wages wift for all the possible firm-worker
pairs this means we impose E [εift|Xift,dift = 1]=E [εift|Xift] where Xift is our set of
covariates and fixed effects and dift is a dummy taking value one if worker i is employed
by firm f at time t. Though admittedly restrictive, this hypothesis is made less strong
by the fact that we use a large battery of controls for worker, past employer, and current
employer characteristics while accounting for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
by means of both firm and worker fixed effects. Furthermore, it is actually quite plausible
that selection induces a downward bias of our premia which are thus to be considered
as conservative. For example, suppose wages wift reflect workers’ productivity and
that firm f hires the most productive worker from a set I . We would then have
dift=1
(
X
′
iftβ + εift ≥ maxi∗∈I X
′
i∗ftβ + εi∗ft
)
, where 1(.) is an indicator function. Under
this assumption dift depends on both X
′
ift and εift while E [εift|Xift,dift = 1] decreases
in those components of the covariates vector X
′
ift corresponding to a positive coefficient
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(like export experience) so inducing a downward bias.15
Omitted Variables. One caveat potentially applying to our analysis is that export experi-
ence might be a proxy for some omitted variables. For example, having being employed
by an exporter could signal the unobserved ability of a manager if exporters screen
workers more effectively (e.g. Helpman et al., 2010, 2016). Another possibility is that
workers (previously) employed by exporters could be expected to enjoy stronger wage
rises over the course of their career—as would occur, given the (widely documented)
productivity advantage of exporters, in the context of strategic wage bargaining and
on-the-job search (e.g. Cahuc et al., 2006).16 We account for these issues in three ways.
First, we use worker fixed effects to capture any time-invariant unobserved characteristic
of the worker (including ability); second, we use key previous firm characteristics (size,
productivity, and industry) suggested by the strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job
search literature as well as by the literature on inter-industry wage differentials (Gibbons
and Katz, 1992) to control for the fact that features of previous jobs are expected to have
an impact on the current salary; third, we use a refined definition of export experience
that is more directly linked to the actual exporting activities undertaken by the worker’s
previous firms as well as being a feature that, unlike general ability, is more valuable
to some firms than others —i.e. matched destination or product export experience.
We find it considerably more difficult to argue that matched export experience does
not correspond to valuable trade-specific knowledge acquired when working for an
exporting firm.
Censoring. Export experience and matched export experience depend on the whole
professional history of a worker. For some observations, this history is not entirely
observed in our data, which exclusively covers the years 1995 to 2005. For those workers
that we consider not having experience based on the observed data, it is possible that
they acquired export experience before 1995. This is a problem of missing data due to
censoring. To deal with this issue we use a different definition of export experience and
matched export experience and explore its quantitative implications. More specifically,
we impose experience to be acquired either in t− 1 or t− 2 and get rid of both 1995 and
1996 data. Results (available upon request) are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to
our core findings.
15Intuitively, given that the firm f has chosen worker i (dift = 1), an increase in X
′
iftβ (think of this as the
firm considering a manager with export experience with respect to one that has no experience) means that
the unobserved component εift needs not to be that large for worker i to be chosen: negative correlation
between εift and X
′
iftβ conditional on dift = 1.
16In these models workers employed by more productive/larger firms will, on average, receive better
on-the-job offers from other firms.
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5. Trade performance analysis
The second step of our analysis is to assess whether export experience brought by
managers has an impact on a firm’s trade performance. We model a firm’s likelihood
to start/continue exporting a specific product or to a specific destination and the value
of exports conditional on entry/continuation. We control for endogeneity in a variety
of ways, including firm-year fixed effects and market-year dummies to account for
unobservables.
In order to deal with the endogeneity of hiring we use two complementary ap-
proaches. First, we draw on the panel nature of the data and use information on whether
the firm had managers with destination-specific or product-specific export experience
3 years prior to evaluating firm-performance in those destinations or products. This
instrumental variable approach is inspired by Roberts and Tybout (1997) who show that
3 years can be considered a sufficiently long time span for the past not to matter for export
activity. Second, we focus our analysis on a specific country and explore the differential
performance of firms with and without managers with specific export experience in the
wake of an exogenous event: the sudden end of the Angolan civil war in 2002. The shock
was unanticipated and right after the shock exporting firms did not have the time to
prepare themselves to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the new politically
stable setting by, for example, hiring managers with export experience.
In our analysis we show that basic export experience does not significantly affect trade
performance in any of the margins we consider. What does impact trade performance is
specific export experience and the evidence is quite rich and consistent. The presence of
(at least) one manager with specific (destination or product) export experience positively
affects both the probability to start and continue exporting, with the magnitude being
particularly sizeable for the former. Destination- and product-specific export experience
substantially increase the value of exports conditional on continuation while product-
specific experience also seems to have an impact on export values conditional on entry.
Furthermore, we find experience to be more valuable to firms selling products that
are more differentiated and/or financially vulnerable while at the same time export
experience seems to help some firms coping with increasing import competition from
China.
These results add to the raw data evidence provided in Section 3 and, along with
the existence of a wage premium for managers with matched export experience, are
consistent with the hypothesis those managers carry valuable export-specific knowledge
increasing their wage, and that such knowledge has a strong destination- and product-
specific nature. Later on in Section 5.6, we discuss a number of caveats potentially
applying to our analysis, including reverse causality.
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5.1 Econometric model
We consider the sample of firms with at least one manager and index firms by f , time
by t and export markets by m, where m could either indicate a destination d (experience
in a destinations regressions) or a product p (experience in a product regressions).17
At each point in time we observe whether firm f exports: (i) to one of our seven
destination groups; (ii) one of our 29 Isic rev2 product groups. We model a firm’s entry
and continuation into market m and analyze both the probability to start and continue
exporting as well as the value of exports conditional on entry/continuation. We now
describe the entry model with the one for continuation being its mirror image.
For each firm f and time t ∈ [1996, 2005], we consider all the markets m to which
the firm was not exporting in t − 1. We construct the binary dependent variable
Entryfmt taking value one when firm f starts exporting to market m at time t (and
zero otherwise). In each period, each firm decides whether or not to enter into one
or more of the markets (destination or product groups) in which it was not present in
the previous year. We then define the continuous dependent variable Exportsfmt equal
to (log) exports of firm f to market m at time t. Exportsfmt is observed when Entryfmt=1.
The following selection model is estimated:
Entryfmt = 1[Entry∗fmt>0],
Entry∗fmt = δ1 +ManExpfmtβ1 + Z
′
1ftΓ1 + η1mt + ζ1fmt, (2)
Exportsfmt = δ2 +ManExpfmtβ2 + Z′2ftΓ2 + η2mt + ζ2fmt,
where ManExpfmt—our main variable of interest—is a dummy indicating the presence
of (at least) one manager with export experience and/or specific export experience, Z1ft
and Z2ft are two vectors of firm- and time-varying covariates affecting, respectively, entry
and exports conditional on entry that are captured with either observables or firm-year
fixed effects,18 and η1mt and η2mt are market-year dummies.
We consider separately export experience and specific export experience and estimate
one specification of equation (2) for the former—in which we allow for firm fixed effects—
and three specifications for the latter—in which we allow for either firm or firm-year fixed
17Our trade performance analysis is representative of larger and more organizationally structured firms
that account for the bulk of trade in Portugal. Firms with at least one manager represent (in 2005)
53.6 percent of exporting firms, account for 91.8 percent of exports, and 61.5 percent of manufacturing
employment. See Section 2 for further details.
18Observables are firm size, productivity, share of skilled workers, age, foreign ownership, mean and
standard deviation of both age and education of its managers, mean and standard deviation of the worker
fixed effects corresponding to its managers and coming from the wage analysis, and industry-level exports.
See Section 2 and the Appendix for further details.
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effects and also consider IV. We use market-year dummies in all specifications. We run
separate regressions for destination- and product-specific experience. At the same time
we provide results obtained from more sophisticated specifications where: (i) we interact
experience in a product with a measure of the degree of differentiation of product p as
well as the degree of financial vulnerability of product p; (ii) we break down the data
at the firm-time-product-destination level and interact experience in a destination with
a Chinese import penetration measure – based on Autor et al. (2014) – for product p in
destination d at time t.
Moving to the assumptions we make about (2), when considering basic export experi-
ence, ManExpfmt is only firm-time varying (i.e. ManExpfmt=ManExpft) and equals one
if firm f has at time t at least one manager with export experience (zero otherwise). In
this case, we allow for firm fixed effects, i.e. ζ1fmt=η1f + υ1fmt and ζ2fmt=η2f + υ2fmt, and
assume that υ1fmt and υ2fmt are uncorrelated with each other as well as with covariates.
Under these conditions, we can separately estimate the selection and outcome equations
using the OLS estimator while clustering standard errors at the firm-level.
When considering specific export experience, ManExpfmt is instead firm-market-time
varying and equals one if firm f has at time t at least one manager with market m-specific
export experience (zero otherwise). In this case, we can be more general and allow
for firm-year fixed effects while getting rid of the redundant firm-time observables: we
consider ζ1fmt=η1ft + υ1fmt and ζ2fmt=η2ft + υ2fmt, and assume υ1fmt and υ2fmt are
uncorrelated with each other as well as with covariates. We use again the OLS estimator
for both the selection and outcome equations and cluster standard errors at the firm-level.
Last but not least, we also provide IV estimations results while simultaneously dealing
with endogeneity by means of firm-year fixed effects. More specifically, we allow υ1fmt
and υ2fmt to be correlated with specific export experience ManExpfmt and consider as
instrument specific export experience three years prior to t: ManExpfmt−3. Indeed,
Roberts and Tybout (1997) show that 3 years can be considered a sufficiently long time
span for the past not to matter for export activity.19 To ease comparability, we consider
the same sample in the first three specifications. However, when using IV ManExpfmt−3
is missing in quite a few cases and so the number of observations will be smaller.
Four comments are in order. First, the identifying variation for export experience
is provided by its changes over time within a firm. In the case of specific export
experience and firm fixed effects, identification also comes from variation in the market
dimension, still within a firm. When considering specific experience and firm-year fixed
19More specifically Roberts and Tybout (1997) find that "...last year’s exporting status Yi,t−1 has a strong
positive effect on the probability of exporting this year. But plants that last exported two or three years ago
enjoy only small lingering effects from their previous investments in foreign-market access." and further
add that "...we cannot reject the hypothesis that both coefficients are jointly equal to zero."
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effects identification comes from the within-firm market variation only meaning that, for
example, when analyzing the probability to start exporting we draw on firms entering in
at least two markets in the same year (one market for which the firm has a manager with
specific export experience and one for which it has not) to identify β1.
Second, the selection equation corresponds to a liner probability model. Such a model
has a number of advantages over non-linear alternatives but also a number of caveats
when dealing with fixed effects (Wooldridge, 2002); estimations of a fixed effects Logit
model (available upon request) qualitatively confirm linear probability model results.
Third, imposing that υ1fmt and υ2fmt are uncorrelated with each other amounts
to assuming that, once firm-time and market-time covariates and/or fixed effects are
controlled for, selection is no longer an issue. This is consistent with the literature on
trade and firm heterogeneity (pioneered by Bernard and Jensen, 1999), which relies
on either firm-time determinants (productivity, size, past export status, skill intensity,
R&D intensity) or market-time determinants (distance and other proxies for trade costs,
market size, other market characteristics like the quality of institutions) to model a firm’s
export behavior across time and markets. We distinguish ourselves from this literature
by providing a full firm-market-time varying determinant of export behavior.
Finally, all key right-hand side variables (including ManExpfmt) have been divided
by their respective standard deviation to provide a comparable metric. For example, a
coefficient of 0.0x for firm size in the selection equation indicates that a one standard
deviation increase in firm size roughly increases the probability of entry by x percent.
Coefficients are thus comparable, in terms of how much variation in the probability
of entry (or continuation) or in the value of exports is induced, across covariates and
specifications.
5.2 Baseline results
Tables 7 to 10 report key covariates estimates of our model of a firm’s likelihood to
start/continue exporting a specific product or to a specific destination and the value of
exports conditional on entry/continuation. More specifically, Tables 7 for destinations
and 8 for products refer to the probability to entry (left panel) and to continue (right
panel) exporting to a specific market while in Tables 9 for destinations and 10 for
products we consider the (log) value of exports conditional on entry (left panel) and
continuation (right panel). All the other covariates are displayed in the Tables Appendix.
The overall picture stemming from Tables 7 to 10 can be summarized as follows:
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Table 7: Probability to Start and Continue Exporting to a Specific Destination
Prob. Start Exporting Prob. Continue Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unconditional Prob. 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.061 0.870 0.870 0.877 0.871
Manag. w/ Export Exp. 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp. 0.013a 0.018a 0.040a 0.005a 0.014a 0.046a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.013)
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Destination-Year Dummies X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
IV X X
Observations 166,860 166,860 166,860 62,392 52,124 52,124 52,124 24,859
R2 0.175 0.176 0.338 — 0.256 0.257 0.420 —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core covariates of our model
of firm’s entry and continuation into a foreign destination (2). Estimation results for all other covariates are provided
in the Tables Appendix. The dependent variable takes value one when a firm f starts exporting to a new (left panel) or
continues exporting to a current (right panel) destination d at time t. The key independent variable in columns (1) and
(5) is a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with export experience. In columns (2) to (4) and (6) to
(8), the key variable is instead a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with destination-specific export
experience. See Section 3 for the definition of a manager and the export experience (and its refinements). Specifications
in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) include firm fixed effects while specifications (3), (4), (7) and (8) include firm-year
fixed effects. Specifications in columns (4) and (8) employ an IV estimator while other specifications refer to an OLS
estimator. The instrument is the value of the dummy indicating whether the firm has at least one manager with
destination-specific export experience at time t − 3. This information is sometimes missing so leading to a smaller
estimation sample. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
Table 8: Probability to Start and Continue Exporting a Specific Product
Prob. Start Exporting Prob. Continue Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unconditional Prob. 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.732 0.732 0.702 0.727
Manag. w/ Export Exp. 0.000 -0.002
(0.000) (0.004)
Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp. 0.008a 0.009a 0.018a 0.031a 0.048a 0.120a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011)
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Product-Year Dummies X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
IV X X
Observations 775,675 775,675 775,675 313,369 40,125 40,125 40,125 17,647
R2 0.070 0.073 0.128 — 0.205 0.214 0.364 —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core covariates of our model of
firm’s starting and continuing exporting a specific product (2). Estimation results for all other covariates are provided
in the Tables Appendix. The dependent variable takes value one when a firm f starts exporting a new (left panel) or
continues exporting a current (right panel) product p at time t. The key independent variable in columns (1) and (5) is
a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with export experience. In columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8), the
key variable is instead a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with product-specific export experience.
See Section 3 for the definition of a manager and the export experience (and its refinements). Specifications in columns
(1), (2), (5), and (6) include firm fixed effects while specifications (3), (4), (7) and (8) include firm-year fixed effects.
Specifications in columns (4) and (8) employ an IV estimator while other specifications refer to an OLS estimator. The
instrument is the value of the dummy indicating whether the firm has at least one manager with product-specific export
experience at time t− 3. This information is sometimes missing so leading to a smaller estimation sample. Standard
errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table 9: (Log) Value of Exports to a Specific Destination Conditional on Entry or
Continuation
Exports Condit. Entry Exports Condit. Contin.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Manag. w/ Export Exp. 0.025 0.017
(0.044) (0.011)
Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp. 0.043 -0.026 -0.043 0.059a 0.157a 0.452a
(0.034) (0.080) (0.251) (0.011) (0.031) (0.112)
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Destination-Year Dummies X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
IV X X
Observations 6,732 6,732 6,732 1,463 45,023 45,023 45,023 21,414
R2 0.478 0.478 0.597 — 0.506 0.507 0.544 —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core covariates of our
model of firm’s entry and continuation into a foreign destination (2). Estimation results for all other covariates are
provided in the Tables Appendix. The dependent variable is equal to the (log) exports value of firm f to destination
d at time t. This variable is observed only if firm f starts (continues) exporting to destination d at time t. The
key independent variable in columns (1) and (5) is a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with
export experience. In columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8), the key variable is instead a dummy indicating if the firm
has at least one manager with destination-specific export experience. See Section 3 for the definition of a manager
and the export experience (and its refinements). Specifications in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) include firm fixed
effects while specifications (3), (4), (7) and (8) include firm-year fixed effects. Specifications in columns (4) and (8)
employ an IV estimator while other specifications refer to an OLS estimator. The instrument is the value of the
dummy indicating whether the firm has at least one manager with destination-specific export experience at time
t− 3. This information is sometimes missing so leading to a smaller estimation sample. Standard errors clustered at
the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
Table 10: (Log) Value of Exports of a Specific Product Conditional on Entry or
Continuation
Exports Condit. Entry Exports Condit. Contin.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Manag. w/ Export Exp. 0.077c 0.032
(0.040) (0.023)
Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp. 0.104a 0.107a 0.118 0.190a 0.379a 1.084a
(0.018) (0.024) (0.082) (0.016) (0.031) (0.119)
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Product-Year Dummies X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
IV X X
Observations 11,853 11,853 11,853 4,403 29,033 29,033 29,033 11,358
R2 0.419 0.421 0.558 — 0.440 0.445 0.411 —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core covariates of our model
of firm’s starting and continuing exporting a specific product (2). Estimation results for all other covariates are
provided in the Tables Appendix. The dependent variable is equal to the (log) exports value of firm f of product p at
time t. This variable is observed only if firm f starts (continues) exporting product p at time t. The key independent
variable in columns (1) and (5) is a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with export experience. In
columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8), the key variable is instead a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager
with product-specific export experience. See Section 3 for the definition of a manager and the export experience (and
its refinements). Specifications in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) include firm fixed effects while specifications (3), (4),
(7) and (8) include firm-year fixed effects. Specifications in columns (4) and (8) employ an IV estimator while other
specifications refer to an OLS estimator. The instrument is the value of the dummy indicating whether the firm has
at least one manager with product-specific export experience at time t− 3. This information is sometimes missing
so leading to a smaller estimation sample. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01,
bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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The presence of basic export experience does not increase trade performance. Columns (1)
and (5) in the four Tables strongly indicate that just having one or more managers with
basic export experience neither increases the probability to start or continue exporting a
specific product or in a specific market not implies higher export values.
The presence of specific export experience does increase trade performance. Columns (2) to
(4) and (6) to (8) in the four Tables strongly indicate that having one or more managers
with specific export experience increases the probability to start and continue exporting
a specific product or in a specific market and goes along with higher export values. In
terms of the latter the estimated IV impact in column (8) is 57% (exp(0.452) − 1) for
export to a specific destination conditional on continuation and a stunning 195% for
export of a specific product conditional on continuation. As far as the value of exports
conditional on entry is concerned we do not find robust evidence of a boost effect. There
is some evidence of a positive impact for product-specific experience but it does not
survive in the IV specification. Moving to probabilities of entry and continuation we
find strong evidence of a positive effect across the board. When compared to the raw
probabilities reported in the top part of Tables 7 and 8, IV estimates in columns (4)
imply that both destination-specific and product-specific experience almost double the
probability to start exporting. When looking at the probability to continue exporting
(column 8), the magnitudes relative to raw probabilities are instead in the range of 5-15%.
There are many ways of rationalizing a smaller impact on continuation with respect to
entry: A possible explanation is that firms that already export to a given market are
likely to have managers without specific export experience who helped the firm to enter
to that market in the past. Therefore, the impact of having a manager with specific export
experience might well be positive for such firms (as suggested by our analysis) but not
as important as for firms who wish to start exporting.
Furthermore, when confronting the coefficients corresponding to the presence of
specific export experience with those (see Tables Appendix) of more established covari-
ates used in the trade literature, like firm size and productivity, we find that specific
(destination or product) experience always matters more than productivity while firm
size explains more variation than specific experience only for the probability to continue
exporting to a specific destination. In the remaining 3 cases destination-specific experi-
ence matters more than firm size while product-specific experience always explains more
variation than firm size.
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5.3 An event study: the sudden end of the Angolan civil war
In order to strengthen the causal interpretation of our findings we explore the differential
performance of firms with and without managers with destination-specific export experi-
ence in the wake of an exogenous event: the sudden end of the Angolan civil war in 2002.
As discussed in Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007), the Angolan civil war suddenly ended
with the death of the rebels’ leader, Jonas Savimbi, on February 22, 2002. The event was
completely unexpected and represents an exogenous conflict-related event in which one
party gained an unambiguous victory over the other and restored order. Furthermore,
Angola is particularly relevant in our case because it is a former Portuguese colony
still having strong ties with Portugal while being part of the Community of Portuguese
Language Countries (CPLC). In this respect, it is a well known export destination for
Portuguese firms and with a significant amount of trade occurring before, during and
after the civil war.
Figure 10: Export entry rates in Angola
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Notes: This Figure shows export entry rates in Angola, defined as the ratio between the number of firms starting to export in Angola
at time t and the number of firms not exporting to Angola at time t-1, for two groups of firms: those that have no managers with
export experience in Angola at time t and those that have at least one manager with export experience in Angola at time t.
The war started many years prior to our observational period (1997-2005) and ended
suddenly in 2002. This means that, right after the shock, exporting firms did not have
the time to prepare themselves to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the new
politically stable setting by, for example, hiring managers with export experience. Yet,
some firms in 2002 had managers with export experience in Angola while others had not.
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In this respect, Figure 10 shows export entry rates for firms with at least one manager
with specific export experience in Angola and firms without such managers. In line with
Figure 6 in Section 3.3 entry rates for the former group are always larger than for the
latter group. Crucially, there is a sudden spike in export entry rates for firms with at
least one manager with export experience in Angola in 2002. The situation is then a bit
mixed after 2002 which can be understood with other shocks taking place as well as firms
having had the time to adjust to the new situation.
Table 11: Probability to Start Exporting in Angola
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 1 pse 2 pse 3 pse 4 pse
Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) 0.014a 0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Year>=2000 * Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) -0.001
(0.007)
Year>=2002 * Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) 0.013b 0.021b
(0.005) (0.009)
Year>=2003 * Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) -0.010
(0.007)
Year>=2004 * Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) -0.001
(0.006)
Year>=2005 * Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) 0.004
(0.005)
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X
Firm FE X X X
Observations 28,420 28,420 28,420 28,420
R2 0.024 0.383 0.384 0.384
Notes: This Table reports OLS estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core
covariates of our model of firm’s entry into a foreign destination (2). Estimation results
for all other covariates are provided in the Tables Appendix. The dependent variable
takes value one when a firm f starts exporting to Angola at time t. The key indepen-
dent variable is a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with specific
export experience in Angola. Specifications in columns (2), (3), and (4) include firm
fixed effects. Firm-time controls are firm size, productivity, share of skilled workers,
age, foreign ownership, mean and standard deviation of both age and education of
firm f managers, mean and standard deviation of worker fixed effects corresponding
to the managers of firm f coming from the wage analysis, and industry-level exports.
See the Appendix for more details. All covariates have been divided by their re-
spective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable metric. Standard errors
clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
In order to establish the statistical significance of the 2002 spike and control for other
factors we run our export entry model (2) focusing on Angola as a destination. Data
is only varying across firms and time now and so we drop destination-year dummies
and replace them by year dummies. At the same time, we employ firm fixed effects as
opposed to firm-time fixed effects while always using firm-time controls. We consider
export experience alone as well as interacted with year dummies to detect time breaks
in the data. Key columns are 3 and 4. Column 3 shows specific export experience
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significantly matters only post 2002. At the same time, column 4 makes use of additional
time dummies to show this can be fully attributed to the year 2002, i.e., the year the
conflict suddenly ended.
5.4 Managers arriving and leaving
The analysis presented so far focuses on the presence of managers with experience in a
firm at a given point in time. In what follows we present some additional results about
the arrival and departure of managers with experience. More specifically, we consider
sub-samples of the observations used in the estimations provided in Tables 7 and 8 to
better isolate the arrival of specific export knowledge into a firm and the departure of
specific export knowledge from a firm. We use firm-time fixed effects and market-time
dummies in all estimations.
In terms of arrival we consider, as in column (3) of Tables 7 and 8, firms who are not
exporting in t− 1 and look at whether they export in t or not depending on whether
there is in the firm at least one manager with specific export experience in t. However,
unlike in Tables 7 and 8, we now only consider firms that in t− 1 have no managers with
export experience (neither general nor specific) while further imposing that all firms in
t have managers with export experience—though not necessarily specific the considered
market. This means we compare the probability to start exporting to a given destination
or to start exporting a specific product—for firms without experienced managers in
t − 1—depending on whether the managers arriving in t have export experience that
is specific to the destination/product or not. In both cases, managers with export
experience have arrived in t but in one case the knowledge is specific while in the other
it is not.
In the case of the knowledge leaving a firm we consider, as in column (7) of Tables
7 and 8, firms who are exporting in t− 1 and look at whether they export in t or not
conditional on whether there is in the firm at least one manager with specific export
experience in t. However, unlike in Tables 7 and 8, we now only consider firms that in
t− 1 do have managers with specific export experience while further imposing that all
firms in t have managers with export experience though not necessarily specific to the
considered market. This means we compare the probability to continue exporting to a
given destination or to continue exporting a specific product—for firms with managers
with specific experience—depending on whether the managers that work in the firm in
t have export experience that is specific to the destination/product or not. In one case,
specific export experience remains in the firm while in the other it leaves the firm.
The slice of the data we use to perform these analyses is quite peculiar and subject to
clear selection biases. Therefore, we do not claim any causality for the effects we find
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but still believe they are interesting to look at and compared with previous findings.
Results, reported in Table 12 below, portrait an captivating picture. As far as the arrival
of specific export knowledge is concerned, columns (1) and (2) point to a positive and
significant effect with a magnitude larger than the comparable column (3) of Tables 7
and 8 and broadly in line with IV results in column (4) of Tables 7 and 8. Turning
to specific knowledge leaving a firm column (4) suggests that when product-specific
knowledge departs the probability to continue exporting a specific product substantially
decreases. The magnitude we find is in line with the IV impact we obtain in column (8) of
Table 8. However, when looking at destination-specific knowledge there is no significant
impact. This is in line with a scenario in which the destination-specific knowledge of the
manager leaving the firm has been fully transferred to the firm who does not experience
any reduction in trade performance.
Table 12: Probability to Start and Continue Exporting to a Specific Destination or
a Specific Product Depending on Whether Specific Export Experience Arrives or
Leaves a Firm
Prob. Start Exporting Prob. Continue Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experience Dest. Prod. Dest. Prod.
Arrival or Departure of Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp. 0.048a 0.034a 0.032 -0.109a
(0.007) (0.003) (0.025) (0.029)
Market-Year Dummies X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
Observations 12,231 54,179 14,190 6,772
R2 0.331 0.145 0.454 0.365
Notes: This Table reports OLS coefficients and standard errors for the core covariates of our model of firm’s starting
and continuing exporting a specific product or to a specific destination (2). The dependent variable takes value one
when a firm f starts exporting to a new (left panel) or continues exporting to a current (right panel) market m at time
t. The key independent variable is a dummy indicating if managers with specific export experience have arrived into
(left panel) or left from (right panel) a firm. See Section 3 for the definition of a manager and the export experience
(and its refinements). All specifications include firm-year fixed effects and market-time dummies. Standard errors
clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
5.5 Additional findings
We now come back to analyzing the impact of the presence of managers with export
experience and report in Tables 13 and 14 a number of additional findings. In Table
13 we look at whether specific export experience interacts with the degree of product
differentiation and/or the financial vulnerability of a firm’s products. In this respect
we believe export experience should be relatively more valuable to firms selling more
differentiated products, i.e., products whose attributes are more difficult to observe, and
products needing more financing, for example because of longer production processes
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and larger mismatch between investments and profits requiring more managerial effort
and expertise. We also believe this should be particularly the case for firms starting to
export. In Table 13 we thus look at entry probabilities and focus on experience in a prod-
uct to examine the interaction between the presence of specific export experience with a
measure of product differentiation and a measure of external financial dependence. We
consider only our two most demanding specifications (firm-time fixed effects and IV).
The positive and significant interaction coefficients do suggest that export experience is
more valuable to firms selling more differentiated products and products needing more
external financing.
Table 13: Probability to Start Exporting a Specific Product; Interac-
tions with External Financial Dependence and Product Differentia-
tion
Prob. Start Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manag. w/ Spec. Export Exp. 0.007a 0.008a 0.014a 0.013a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Manag. w/ Spec. Export Exp. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.029a 0.041a
(0.004) (0.011)
Manag. w/ Spec. Export Exp. * Prod. Diff. 0.008b 0.029a
(0.003) (0.008)
Product-Year Dummies X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
IV X X
Observations 775,675 775,675 313,369 313,369
R2 0.128 0.127 — —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core
covariates of our model of firm’s starting exporting a specific product (2) further enriched
with product-specific measures of external financial dependence and product differentia-
tion. Estimation results for all other covariates are provided in the Tables Appendix. The
dependent variable takes value one when a firm f starts exporting a new product p at time
t. The key independent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the interaction between a dummy
indicating if the firm has at least one manager with product-specific export experience and
our measure of external financial dependence. In columns (2) an (4) the key variable is the
interaction between a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with product-
specific export experience and our measure of product differentiation. See Section 3 for
the definition of a manager and the export experience (and its refinements) as well as for
the description of the external financial dependence and product differentiation measures.
All specifications include firm-year fixed effects and product-year dummies. Specifications
in columns (3) and (4) employ an IV estimator while other specifications refer to an OLS
estimator. The instruments for the two reported covariates are built on a dummy indicating
whether the firm has at least one manager with product-specific export experience at time
t− 3. This information is sometimes missing so leading to a smaller estimation sample. All
covariates, except product-year dummies, have been divided by their respective standard
deviation in order to deliver a comparable metric. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level
in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
We perform in Table 14 a related exercise. The recent literature on China and trade
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has documented20 many instances in which increasing imports from China put western
firms and labour markets under competitive pressure generating a number of negative
(employment cuts, firm death) and positive (skill and technological upgrading) reactions.
Within this increasingly difficult environment we believe managerial export experience
should be particularly valuable. To this end we break down our data at the firm-time-
product-destination level and interact experience in a destination with a Chinese import
penetration measure – based on Autor et al. (2014) – for product p in destination d at
time t. Our Chinese import penetration measure proxies for the increasing degree of
competition faced by a firm in exporting its products to a particular destination. We focus
on firms that are already established and thus estimate a model of export continuation
while including both destination-time and product-time dummies along with firm or
firm-time fixed effects. Results shown in Table 14 suggest that import competition
from China reduces continuation probabilities. At the same time the interaction with
experience in a destination is positive and significant in the two non-IV specifications
while being very close to significance in the IV specification; with the latter drawing
on a much smaller sample. Though not extremely robust, these finding may suggest
a connection between increasing import competition from China and the importance of
specific export experience.
5.6 Endogeneity and other issues
Reverse causality. Does a firm hire managers with export experience to improve its trade
performance or does the firm decide (based for example on some positive shocks) to
export and then hires managers with export experience? In other words, how important
is the issue of reversed causality in our analysis?
First, it is important to consider that, as established in Section 4, managers with export
experience cost more and the more so if they have an export experience matching the
market portfolio of a firm. Therefore, such managers should in all likelihood improve
firm performance along some margins and it would be difficult to argue that export
performance (especially when related to specific experience) would not be part of those
margins. Whether the magnitudes we get here are lower or higher than the causal effect
is another question.
Second, shocks pushing a firm to start/continue exporting that have been so far
considered by the international trade literature (Bernard et al., 2012) are firm-time specific
(e.g. productivity, skill intensity, R&D intensity, quality). We fully allow for such shocks
20See, for example, Autor et al. (2014), Bernard et al. (2006), Bloom et al. (2016a) and Mion and Zhu
(2013).
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Table 14: Probability to Continue Exporting a Specific Product to a
Specific Destination; Interaction with Chinese Import Penetration
Prob. Continue Exporting
(1) (2) (3)
Manag. w/ Spec. Export Exp. 0.003 0.012a 0.046a
(0.002) (0.004) (0.014)
Manag. w/ Spec. Export Exp. * Imp. Penetr. China 0.004a 0.005a 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Imp. Penetr. China 0.105 -0.017a -0.023a
(0.998) (0.006) (0.006)
Product-Year Dummies X X X
Destination-Year Dummies X X X
Firm FE and Firm controls X
Firm-Year FE X X
IV X
Observations 1,514,409 1,514,409 757,654
R2 0.302 0.518 —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the
core covariates of an enriched version of our model of firm’s continuation into a foreign
destination (2). Estimation results for all other covariates are provided in the Tables
Appendix. The dependent variable takes value one when a firm f continues exporting
product p to a current destination d at time t. The key independent variables are a dummy
indicating if the firm has at least one manager with destination-specific export experience,
a measure of Chinese import penetration in destination d of product p and time t and the
interaction between the two. See Section 3 for the definition of a manager and the export
experience (and its refinements) as well as for our measure of Chinese import penetration.
The specification in columns (1) includes firm fixed effects and the firm-time covariates
discussed in the previous Tables while specifications (2) and (3) include firm-year fixed
effects. The Specification in columns (3) employs an IV estimator while other specifications
refer to an OLS estimator. The instruments for the first two covariates are built on a
dummy indicating whether the firm has at least one manager with destination-specific
export experience at time t − 3. This information is sometimes missing so leading to a
smaller estimation sample. All specifications include destination-year and product-year
dummies. All covariates, except destination-year and product-year dummies, have been
divided by their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable metric.
Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
and in particular our framework allows such shocks to be arbitrarily correlated with the
presence of managers with specific export experience by means of firm-year fixed effects.
Third, in order to be an issue in our IV analysis, the more general case of firm-time-
market shocks/omitted variables should be such that those unobservables are correlated
with specific export experience at time t as well as at time t− 3. In this respect there
is substantial evidence – including Das et al. (2007), Iacovone and Javorcik (2012) and
Moxnes (2010) – that there are large sunk investment costs firms have to incur in order
to export in a given market and that the time frame corresponding to firm’s decisions
today affecting export performance tomorrow (like setting up or increasing investments
in quality and/or productivity) is about two yeas. Therefore, ManExpfmt−3 should
be uncorrelated with a firm’s shocks and investments in between t − 2 and t; those
eventually leading the firm to improve its trade performance in t.
Fourth, in order to further address the issue of reverse causality we exploit the exo-
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geneity of the sudden end of the Angolan civil war in 2002. The shock was unanticipated
and right after the shock exporting firms did not have the time to prepare themselves
to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the new politically stable setting by,
for example, hiring managers with export experience. However, some firms in 2002 had
managers with export experience in Angola while others had not and we show later on
this makes a difference.
Finally, IV estimates in our analysis are typically larger than non-instrumented one.
We believe this is consistent with substitutability being at work between hiring a manager
with export experience and other export performance-enhancing forms of investments.
More specifically, suppose that a firm is interested in entering (or staying, or improving
its performance) in market m. The firm can either hire a manager with market-m export
experience or undertake another costly activity, Afmt, unobservable to us. Suppose that
both choices affect the firm trade performance with respect to market m. Both choices
are costly: in particular, our wage analysis shows that hiring a manager with specific
export experience entails paying an extra wage premium. If the distribution of the
unobservable Afmt across firms, markets and time is positively (negatively) correlated
to ManExpfmt, the estimated coefficient of the latter will be upward (downward) biased.
A positive correlation means that the A activity and hiring a manager with specific
export experience are complementary. A negative correlation instead reveals that the two
forms of investment are substitutes. The empirical international trade literature (Bernard
et al., 2012) has no clear stance towards investments improving trade performance being
substitutes or complements. Therefore, the sign of the bias is a priori ambiguous and our
IV findings point towards substitutability.
Selection. The value of exports is observed only if a firm starts or continues to export to
a market. We cope with the issue of firm selection into a market by using firm-year fixed
effects and market-year dummies; most of the determinants of export entry emphasized
by the trade literature are either at the firm-time or market-time level. A more recent
strand of the literature, including Morales et al. (2014), is exploring other determinants of
firm export behavior which are truly firm-time-market specific and are related to a firm’s
past activity in “related” markets. We could certainly incorporate such determinants in
our analysis to better address selection but, so far, it is not clear whether they provide
valid exclusion restriction, i.e. whether they affect entry and/or continuation but not the
value of exports.
Alternative definitions of entry and continuation. Though characterized by an overall strong
degree of persistency over time, export activity can be erratic, especially when consid-
ering "young exporters". Eaton et al. (2008) show, using Colombian data, that nearly
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one half of all new exporters stops exporting after just one year, and total exports are
dominated by a small number of large and stable exporters.21 Békés and Muraközy
(2012) shows, using Hungarian data, that temporary trade is a pervasive feature of the
data which is characterized by a number of specificities in terms of the firms, markets,
and products involved. Therefore, a concern could be whether our results are sensitive
to the the presence of short-lived export participation. In unreported results, available
upon request, we have experimented with more stringent definitions of continuing and
new exporters in a given market, based on the firm activity both in t− 1 and in t− 2 (as
in Eaton et al., 2008), finding very similar results.
Alternative way of dealing with reverse causality. As an alternative way of dealing with
reverse causality we construct an additional manager with specific experience dummy.
We consider such dummy being equal to one if the firm has at least one manager with
specific experience in t with the additional constraint that the managers should have been
hired by the firm either in t− 1 or t− 2 or t− 3. In unreported results, available upon
request, we have used such a dummy as an alternative instrument. Estimations confirm
our previous findings.
6. Conclusions
This paper exploits a unique dataset for Portugal that allows to finely measure firm
trade performance and managers’ wages as well as to draw a sharp portrait of managers’
mobility across firms. The paper shows that the export experience gained by managers in
previous firms leads their current firm towards higher export performance, and commands
a sizeable wage premium for the manager. Moreover, export knowledge proves to be very
valuable when it is market-specific: managers with experience related to markets served
by their current firm receive an even higher wage premium; firms are more likely to
enter markets where their managers have experience; exporters are more likely to stay
in those markets, and their sales are on average higher. At the same time, we show that
the experience premium accrued by different types of managers (general, production,
financial and sales) aligns with a knowledge diffusion story. We also find market-specific
experience to be more valuable in terms of trade performance to firms selling products
that are more differentiated and/or financially vulnerable while at the same time expe-
rience seems to help some firms coping with increasing import competition from China.
Last but not least, when focusing on the Angolan market, we find robust evidence that
export experience in Angola drives a differential behaviour across firms in terms of their
21See Amador and Opromolla (2013) for similar findings using Portuguese data.
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entry rates in 2002, which is exactly the year the civil war unexpectedly came to a swift
end.
Our findings point to the existence of sizeable knowledge diffusion across firms via
the mobility of managers. Our results contribute to the recent empirical literature that,
by exploiting the increasing availability of information on managerial practices and
managers’ characteristics, has established a strong connection between managers and
firms’—as well as countries’—productivity and other dimensions of performance. There
are several policy and theoretical implications stemming from our analysis. From the
policy side, the presence of such knowledge flows means that policies directly affecting
managerial skills and knowledge in some firms will sooner or later spill-over to other
firms. With specific reference to the export activity, this has profound implications for
the design and evaluation of export promotion programmes. On the theory side this casts
doubts about current models of export participation and in particular on the assumption
that decisions to export are independent across firms.
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Appendix
A-1. Trade data
Statistics Portugal collects data on export and import transactions by firms that are
located in Portugal on a monthly basis. These data include the value and quantity of
internationally traded goods (i) between Portugal and other Member States of the EU
(intra-EU trade) and (ii) by Portugal with non-EU countries (extra-EU trade). Data on
extra-EU trade are collected from customs declarations, while data on intra-EU trade are
collected through the Intrastat system, which, in 1993, replaced customs declarations as
the source of trade statistics within the EU. The same information is used for official
statistics and, besides small adjustments, the merchandise trade transactions in our
dataset aggregate to the official total exports and imports of Portugal. Each transac-
tion record includes, among other information, the firm’s tax identifier, an eight-digit
Combined Nomenclature product code, the destination/origin country, the value of the
transaction in euros, the quantity (in kilos and, in some case, additional product-specific
measuring units) of transacted goods, and the relevant international commercial term
(FOB, CIF, FAS, etc.).I We were able to gain access to data from 1995 to 2005 for the
purpose of this research. We use data on export transactions only, aggregated at the
firm-destination-year level.
A-2. Matched employer-employee data
The second main data source, Quadros de Pessoal, is a longitudinal dataset matching
virtually all firms and workers based in Portugal.II Currently, the data set collects data on
about 350,000 firms and 3 million employees. As for the trade data, we were able to gain
access to information from 1995 to 2005. The data are made available by the Ministry
of Employment, drawing on a compulsory annual census of all firms in Portugal that
employ at least one worker. Each year, every firm with wage earners is legally obliged
to fill in a standardized questionnaire. Reported data cover the firm itself, each of its
plants, and each of its workers. Variables available in the dataset include the firm’s
location, industry, total employment, sales, ownership structure (equity breakdown
IIn the case of intra-EU trade, firms have the option of “adding up” multiple transactions only when
they refer to the same month, product, destination/origin country, Portuguese region and port/airport
where the transaction originates/starts, international commercial term, type of transaction (sale, re-
sale,...etc.), and transportation mode. In the case of intra-EU trade, firms are required to provide informa-
tion on their trade transactions if the volume of exports or imports in the current year or in the previous
year or two years before was higher than 60,000 euros and 85,000 euros respectively. More information can
be found at: http://webinq.ine.pt/public/files/inqueritos/pubintrastat.aspx?Id=168.
IIPublic administration and non-market services are excluded. Quadros de Pessoal has been used by,
amongst others, Cabral and Mata (2003) to study the evolution of the firm size distribution; by Blanchard
and Portugal (2001) to compare the U.S. and Portuguese labor markets in terms of unemployment duration
and worker flows; by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) to study the determinants of both the contractual wage
and the wage cushion (difference between contractual and actual wages); by Carneiro et al. (2012) who, in
a related study, analyze how wages of newly hired workers and of existing employees react differently to
the business cycle; by Martins (2009) to study the effect of employment protection on worker flows and
firm performance. See these papers also for a description of the peculiar features of the Portuguese labor
market.
I
among domestic private, public or foreign), and legal setting. The worker-level data
cover information on all personnel working for the reporting firms in a reference week.
They include information on gender, age, occupation, schooling, hiring date, earnings,
hours worked (normal and overtime), etc. The information on earnings includes the base
wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), seniority-indexed components of pay, other
regularly paid components, overtime work, and irregularly paid components.III It does
not include employers’ contributions to social security.
Each firm entering the database is assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying num-
ber which we use to follow it over time. The Ministry of Employment implements
several checks to ensure that a firm that has already reported to the database is not
assigned a different identification number. Similarly, each worker also has a unique
identifier, based on a worker’s social security number, allowing us to follow individuals
over time. The administrative nature of the data and their public availability at the
workplace—as required by the law—imply a high degree of coverage and reliability.
The public availability requirement facilitates the work of the services of the Ministry of
Employment that monitor the compliance of firms with the law (e.g., illegal work).
A-3. Combined dataset and data processing
The two datasets are merged by means of the firm identifier. As in Cardoso and
Portugal (2005), we account for sectoral and geographical specificities of Portugal by
restricting the sample to include only firms based in continental Portugal while excluding
agriculture and fishery (Nace rev.1, 2-digit industries 1, 2, and 5) as well as minor service
activities and extra-territorial activities (Nace rev.1, 2-digit industries 95, 96, 97, and 99).
Concerning workers, we consider only single-job, full-time workers between 16 and 65
years old, and working between 25 and 80 hours (base plus overtime) per week. Our
analysis focuses on manufacturing firms only (Nace rev.1 codes 15 to 37) because of the
closer relationship between the export of goods and the industrial activity of the firm.
Even though we focus on manufacturing firms we use data both on manufacturing and
non-manufacturing firms to build some of our variables, including export experience as
well as the Nace rev.1 2-digit code, size, and productivity of the previous employing firm.
Each worker in Quadros de Pessoal (QP) has a unique identifier based on her social
security number. We drop from the sample a minority of workers with an invalid social
security number and with multiple jobs. If a worker is employed in a particular year, we
observe the corresponding firm identifier for that year. Since worker-level variables are
missing in 2001, we assign a firm to workers in 2001 in the following way: if a worker is
employed by firm A in 2002 and the year in which the worker had been hired (by firm
A) is before 2001 or is 2001, then we assign the worker to firm A in 2001 as well; for all
other workers, we repeat the procedure using 2003. In case neither 2002 nor 2003 allow
us to assign a firm to a worker in 2001, we leave the information as missing.
All the information in QP is collected during the month of November of each year.
Worker-level variables refer to October of the same year. To control for outliers, we apply
a trimming based on the hourly wage and eliminate 0.5 percent of the observations on
IIIIt is well known that employer-reported wage information is subject to less measurement error than
worker-reported data. Furthermore, the Quadros de Pessoal registry is routinely used by the inspectors of
the Ministry of Employment to monitor whether the firm wage policy complies with the law.
II
both extremes of the distribution. We thank Anabela Carneiro for providing us with the
conversion table between education categories (as defined in QP) and number of years of
schooling. Firm-level variables refer to the current calendar year (except firm total sales
that refer to the previous calendar year). The location of the firm is measured according
to the NUTS 3 regional disaggregation. In the trade dataset, we restrict the sample to
transactions registered as sales as opposed to returns, transfers of goods without transfer
of ownership, and work done.
A-4. Definitions
Some concepts are recurring in the explanation of a majority of the tables and figures.
We define them here.
Firm-level variables
Firm Age Firm age at time t is equal to the (log) difference between t and the year
(minus one) the firm was created. The year the firm was created is replaced to missing
whenever it is earlier than 1600.
Firm Export Status We divide firms into new, never, continuing, exiting and other
exporters. Firm f at time t is a new exporter if the firm exports in t but not in t− 1. If
the opposite happens, the firm is an exiting exporter at time t. If the firm exports both
in t− 1 and in t it is a continuing exporter in t. If the firm does not export neither in
t− 1 nor in t then it is a never exporter in t. If the firm is not observed in t− 1 then we
classify it as other exporter in t. Never exporter is the reference category in the wage
analysis.
Firm Productivity Firm (apparent labor) productivity at time t is equal to the (log) ratio
between total sales (sales in the domestic market plus exports) and the number of all
workers employed by the firm as resulting from the firm record.
Firm Size Firm size at time t is equal to the (log) number of all workers employed by
the firm as resulting from the firm record.
Foreign Ownership A firm is defined as foreign-owned if 50 percent or more of its
equity is owned by a non-resident.
Industry-level Exports They are obtained aggregating HS6 codes export data from the
BACI dataset provided by CEPII and represent (log) aggregate exports of Portugal of
products belonging to Nace rev.1 2-digit industries.
Share of Skilled Workers Share of firm’s workers with 12 or more years of education.
Worker-level variables
Hourly Wage (Log) hourly wage is computed adding base and overtime wages plus
regular benefits (at the month-level) and dividing by the number of regular and overtime
hours worked in the reference week multiplied by 4.3¯. We apply a trimming of the top
and bottom 0.5 per cent. Regular and overtime hours worked are set to (i) missing if
(individually) greater than 480 per month, (ii) to zero if negative.
Hiring Date The year the worker was hired in the firm is a variable that is directly
registered in QP. Since there are few instances when the hiring date changes from year
III
to year for the same worker-firm spell, we create a robust version of the hiring date
computed using the mode for each firm-worker spell. If there is a tie, we take the
minimum year in the spell.
Tenure This variable is measured as the difference between the current year and the
hiring date.
Country-groups
We partition export destinations into seven groups: Spain, other top 5 export destination
countries (Italy, UK, France, and Germany), other EU countries (Austria, Belgium
or Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden), OECD
countries not belonging to the EU (USA, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand,
Poland, Slovakia, Turkey), countries belonging to the Community of Portuguese
Language Countries (CPLP in Portuguese—Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau,
Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, and Timor-Leste), China, and the rest of the
World. We adopted this partition because of the following reasons. First, Portugal is
an economy deeply rooted into the European market. EU countries are special and
we further divide them into top 5 destinations (based on the number of Portuguese
exporting firms, as well as total exports, in 2005) and other EU countries. The strong
cultural ties and proximity to Spain also require attention which is why we separately
consider Spain. Exports to OECD as compared to non-OECD countries are likely to be
different in terms of both exported products and quality range. At the same time, China
and countries sharing language ties with Portugal are also likely to be characterized by
different exports patterns.
Product-groups
We use the Isic rev2 3-digit classification to divide export products into 29 categories
ranging from “Food manufacturing” (code 311) to “Other Manufacturing Industries”
(code 390). The Isic rev2 is a widely used classification allowing to bridge products
to industries and for which both information on the degree of product differentiation -
borrowed from Rauch (1999) - and financial vulnerability - borrowed from Manova et al.
(2015) - is readily available. At the same time data on both trade and production across
countries over 1995-2005 is easily accessible at this level of disaggregation from the CEPII
(Centre d’Etude Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales) trade and production
dataset. This data is needed to compute our measure of Chinese import penetration in
country d for product p à la Autor et al. (2014). The 29 product categories we end up
working with also represent a balance between a sufficient level of detail on the one side
and the need to economise on the dimensionality of the dataset involved in estimations
on the other side.
A-5. High-dimensional fixed effects
All specifications in the paper are estimated with OLS. With large data sets, estimation
of a linear regression model with two high-dimensional fixed effects poses some compu-
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tational challenges (Abowd et al., 1999). However, the exact least-square solution to this
problem can be found using an algorithm, based on the “zigzag” or full Gauss-Seidel
algorithm, proposed by Guimarães and Portugal (2010). We use, for our estimations,
the Stata user-written routine reg2hdfe implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s
algorithm; this routine has also been used in Carneiro et al. (2012), and Martins and
Opromolla (2012). The main advantage of this routine is the ability to fit linear regres-
sion models with two or more high-dimensional fixed effects under minimal memory
requirements. Moreover, the routine provides standard errors correctly adjusted for the
presence of the fixed effects. We apply the reg2hdfe routine setting the convergence
criterion for the iteration method to 0.001. As we are not interested in worker and/or
firm fixed effects per se, we keep all observations for which covariates are available and
not the largest connected group.
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Tables Appendix
Table B-15: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a destina-
tion, controls (1st set, for Table 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (Years) 0.025a 0.025a 0.023a 0.025a 0.025a 0.023a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age Squared (Years) -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (Years) 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure (Years) 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Manager (0/1) 0.559a 0.553a 0.058a 0.559a 0.553a 0.058a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
2nd Firm (or later) -0.016a -0.004a 0.014a -0.016a -0.004a 0.014a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
3rd Firm (or later) 0.015a 0.013a 0.008a 0.015a 0.012a 0.008a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
4th Firm (or later) 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
5th Firm (or later) 0.029a 0.014c 0.016c 0.027a 0.014c 0.015c
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
6th Firm (or later) 0.030 0.051b 0.020 0.029 0.051b 0.020
(0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
7th Firm (or later) 0.174 0.063 0.122 0.169 0.064 0.122
(0.117) (0.091) (0.088) (0.116) (0.091) (0.088)
2nd Firm (or later) and manag. -0.065a -0.047a 0.058a -0.065a -0.047a 0.058a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
3rd Firm (or later) and manag. 0.037a 0.027a 0.054a 0.040a 0.029a 0.055a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
4th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.029b 0.018 0.040a 0.032b 0.020 0.040a
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
5th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.023 -0.022 -0.056b -0.020 -0.019 -0.056b
(0.039) (0.035) (0.027) (0.039) (0.034) (0.028)
6th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.059 0.068 -0.024 0.065 0.074 -0.021
(0.110) (0.106) (0.060) (0.107) (0.102) (0.060)
7th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.709b -0.322c -0.252b -0.685a -0.306c -0.256b
(0.281) (0.192) (0.123) (0.266) (0.176) (0.122)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the first set of controls for the regressions of Table 4. See the Appendix for details
on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain
region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table B-16: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a destination,
controls (2nd set, for Table 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.030a 0.012a 0.054a 0.030a 0.012a 0.054a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Apparent Labor Productivity (log) 0.075a 0.006a 0.005a 0.076a 0.006a 0.005a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exports PT -0.058a 0.047a 0.067a -0.058a 0.047a 0.067a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Age (log) 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.026a 0.014a 0.006a 0.026a 0.014a 0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of Skilled Workers 0.160a -0.080a 0.035a 0.160a -0.080a 0.035a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Size of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.005a 0.053a -0.550a -0.007a 0.053a 0.090
(0.001) (0.001) (0.206) (0.001) (0.001) (0.209)
App. Prod. of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.273a -0.235a -0.097a -0.276a -0.235a -0.097a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Size of Previous Firm -0.007a -0.004a 0.002a -0.006a -0.005a 0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
App. Prod. of Previous Firm 0.030a 0.024a 0.010a 0.030a 0.024a 0.010a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Sector of Previous Firm Equal 0.076a -1.367a 0.077a -1.051a
(0.001) (0.280) (0.001) (0.281)
d_age_mg 0.008c -0.003 0.030a 0.008c -0.002 0.030a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
d_educ_mg -0.080a -0.025a -0.008b -0.080a -0.025a -0.008b
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Export Exp. (0/1) 0.006a 0.014a -0.004c 0.022a 0.010a -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the second set of controls for the regressions of Table 4. See the Appendix for details
on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain region
(NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
VII
Table B-17: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a desti-
nation, controls (3rd set, for Table 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New Exporter (0/1) -0.006a 0.000 0.001 -0.005a -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Continuing Exporter (0/1) -0.017a 0.006a 0.006a -0.015a 0.005a 0.006a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Exiting Exporter (0/1) 0.009a 0.003a 0.003a 0.009a 0.004a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Exporter (0/1) -0.004a 0.003a 0.003a -0.003a 0.003a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sector of Previous Firm Diff -0.056a -1.384a -0.056a -1.069a
(0.001) (0.280) (0.001) (0.281)
Sector of Prev. Firm (0/1) -1.918a -0.963a
(0.250) (0.251)
Matched Export Exp. (0/1) -0.028a 0.007a -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.131 0.129
(.) (.)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the third set of controls for the regressions of Table 4. See the Appendix for
details on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also
contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table B-18: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a product,
controls (1st set, for Table 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (Years) 0.025a 0.025a 0.023a 0.025a 0.025a 0.023a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age Squared (Years) -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (Years) 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure (Years) 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Manager (0/1) 0.559a 0.553a 0.058a 0.560a 0.553a 0.058a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
2nd Firm (or later) -0.016a -0.004a 0.014a -0.016a -0.005a 0.014a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
3rd Firm (or later) 0.015a 0.013a 0.008a 0.015a 0.012a 0.008a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
4th Firm (or later) 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
5th Firm (or later) 0.029a 0.014c 0.016c 0.028a 0.014c 0.016c
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
6th Firm (or later) 0.030 0.051b 0.020 0.030 0.050b 0.020
(0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025)
7th Firm (or later) 0.174 0.063 0.122 0.173 0.065 0.123
(0.117) (0.091) (0.088) (0.116) (0.091) (0.088)
2nd Firm (or later) and manag. -0.065a -0.047a 0.058a -0.067a -0.050a 0.058a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
3rd Firm (or later) and manag. 0.037a 0.027a 0.054a 0.038a 0.027a 0.054a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
4th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.029b 0.018 0.040a 0.031b 0.019 0.040a
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
5th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.023 -0.022 -0.056b -0.020 -0.018 -0.056b
(0.039) (0.035) (0.027) (0.039) (0.035) (0.028)
6th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.059 0.068 -0.024 0.060 0.067 -0.024
(0.110) (0.106) (0.060) (0.107) (0.102) (0.061)
7th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.709b -0.322c -0.252b -0.690a -0.306c -0.253b
(0.281) (0.192) (0.123) (0.266) (0.174) (0.122)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the first set of controls for the regressions of Table 5. See the Appendix for details
on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain
region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table B-19: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a product,
controls (2nd set, for Table 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.030a 0.012a 0.054a 0.030a 0.011a 0.054a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Apparent Labor Productivity (log) 0.075a 0.006a 0.005a 0.075a 0.006a 0.005a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exports PT -0.058a 0.047a 0.067a -0.058a 0.047a 0.067a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Age (log) 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.026a 0.014a 0.006a 0.026a 0.014a 0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of Skilled Workers 0.160a -0.080a 0.035a 0.160a -0.081a 0.035a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Size of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.005a -0.550a -0.006a 0.087
(0.001) (0.206) (0.001) (0.209)
App. Prod. of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.273a -0.235a -0.097a -0.275a -0.233a -0.097a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Size of Previous Firm -0.007a -0.004a 0.002a -0.006a -0.005a 0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
App. Prod. of Previous Firm 0.030a 0.024a 0.010a 0.030a 0.024a 0.010a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Sector of Previous Firm Equal 0.076a -1.367a 0.077a -1.058a
(0.001) (0.280) (0.001) (0.281)
d_age_mg 0.008c -0.003 0.030a 0.008c -0.002 0.030a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
d_educ_mg -0.080a -0.025a -0.008b -0.080a -0.025a -0.008b
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Export Exp. (0/1) 0.006a 0.014a -0.004c 0.013a 0.003a -0.008a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the second set of controls for the regressions of Table 5. See the Appendix for details
on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain region
(NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table B-20: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a prod-
uct, controls (3rd set, for Table 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New Exporter (0/1) -0.006a 0.000 0.001 -0.006a -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Continuing Exporter (0/1) -0.017a 0.006a 0.006a -0.017a 0.004a 0.006a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Exiting Exporter (0/1) 0.009a 0.003a 0.003a 0.009a 0.004a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Exporter (0/1) -0.004a 0.003a 0.003a -0.003a 0.003a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sector of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.053a -1.918a -0.052a -0.972a
(0.001) (0.250) (0.001) (0.251)
Sector of Previous Firm Diff -0.056a -1.384a -0.053a -1.074a
(0.001) (0.280) (0.001) (0.281)
Matched Export Exp. (0/1) -0.012a 0.025a 0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.131 0.130
(.) (6.429)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the third set of controls for the regressions of Table 5. See the Appendix for
details on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also
contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table B-21: Wage regression with different types of managers and export expe-
rience, controls (1st set, for Table 6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (Years) 0.026a 0.025a 0.023a 0.026a 0.025a 0.023a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age Squared (Years) -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (Years) 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure (Years) 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other manager (0/1) 0.500a 0.478a 0.049a 0.501a 0.478a 0.049a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
General manager (0/1) 0.432a 0.520a 0.098a 0.432a 0.520a 0.098a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Production manager (0/1) 0.713a 0.713a 0.090a 0.713a 0.713a 0.090a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Financial manager (0/1) 0.728a 0.730a 0.079a 0.729a 0.731a 0.079a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Sales manager (0/1) 0.801a 0.812a 0.136a 0.802a 0.812a 0.136a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
2nd Firm (or later) -0.017a -0.005a 0.014a -0.017a -0.005a 0.014a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
3rd Firm (or later) 0.015a 0.012a 0.008a 0.015a 0.012a 0.008a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
4th Firm (or later) 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
5th Firm (or later) 0.027a 0.014c 0.016c 0.028a 0.014c 0.016c
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
6th Firm (or later) 0.029 0.050b 0.019 0.029 0.050b 0.020
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
7th Firm (or later) 0.170 0.062 0.123 0.173 0.064 0.124
(0.116) (0.091) (0.088) (0.116) (0.092) (0.088)
2nd Firm (or later) and manag. -0.045a -0.029a 0.057a -0.046a -0.031a 0.058a
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
3rd Firm (or later) and manag. 0.038a 0.027a 0.054a 0.035a 0.025a 0.053a
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
4th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.030b 0.019 0.040a 0.028b 0.018 0.040a
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
5th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.012 -0.014 -0.053c -0.012 -0.014 -0.054b
(0.038) (0.033) (0.027) (0.038) (0.032) (0.027)
6th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.051 0.066 -0.019 0.046 0.061 -0.022
(0.094) (0.091) (0.061) (0.094) (0.091) (0.061)
7th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.623b -0.233 -0.261b -0.625b -0.232 -0.258b
(0.266) (0.171) (0.124) (0.266) (0.169) (0.124)
Constant 0.114 0.115
(15.504) (10.468)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.599 0.698 0.925 0.599 0.698 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the first set of controls for the regressions of Table 6. See the Appendix for details
on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain
region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table B-22: Wage regression with different types of managers and export experi-
ence, controls (2nd set, for Table 6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.030a 0.011a 0.054a 0.029a 0.011a 0.054a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Apparent Labor Productivity (log) 0.075a 0.007a 0.005a 0.075a 0.006a 0.005a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exports PT -0.058a 0.047a 0.067a -0.057a 0.047a 0.067a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Age (log) 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.027a 0.015a 0.006a 0.027a 0.015a 0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of Skilled Workers 0.164a -0.079a 0.035a 0.164a -0.079a 0.035a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Size of Prev. Firm (0/1) 0.054a -0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
App. Prod. of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.273a -0.229a -0.096a -0.272a -0.228a -0.095a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Size of Previous Firm -0.006a -0.005a 0.002a -0.006a -0.005a 0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
App. Prod. of Previous Firm 0.030a 0.023a 0.010a 0.030a 0.023a 0.010a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Sector of Previous Firm Equal 0.077a -2.617a 0.077a -2.621a
(0.001) (0.245) (0.001) (0.245)
d_age_mg 0.010b 0.001 0.030a 0.010b 0.001 0.030a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
d_educ_mg -0.079a -0.026a -0.008b -0.079a -0.026a -0.008b
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Export Exp. (0/1) 0.023a 0.011a -0.003 0.013a 0.003a -0.008a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.599 0.698 0.925 0.599 0.698 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the second set of controls for the regressions of Table 6. See the Appendix for details
on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain region
(NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table B-23: Wage regression with different types of managers and export
experience, controls (3rd set, for Table 6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New Exporter (0/1) -0.005a -0.000 0.001 -0.006a -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Continuing Exporter (0/1) -0.015a 0.004a 0.006a -0.017a 0.004a 0.006a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Exiting Exporter (0/1) 0.008a 0.003a 0.003a 0.008a 0.004a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Exporter (0/1) -0.003a 0.003a 0.003a -0.004a 0.003a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sector of Previous Firm Diff -0.056a -2.635a -0.053a -2.638a
(0.001) (0.245) (0.001) (0.245)
Sector of Prev. Firm (0/1) -2.619a -0.053a -2.623a
(0.245) (0.001) (0.245)
Matched Export Exp. (0/1) -0.029a 0.005a -0.002 -0.013a 0.024a 0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.114 0.115
(15.504) (10.468)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.599 0.698 0.925 0.599 0.698 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the third set of controls for the regressions of Table 6. See the Appendix for
details on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also
contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table B-24: Probability to Start and Continue Exporting
to a Specific Destination, controls (for Table 7)
(1) (2) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.030a 0.027a 0.126a 0.124a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.005b 0.005b 0.010b 0.010b
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm Age (log) 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Exports PT 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Share of Skilled Workers -0.002 -0.003 0.012c 0.012c
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Avg. Managers’ Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Avg. FE Managers 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
Std. Dev. FE Managers -0.002 -0.003c 0.015a 0.014a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 166,860 166,860 52,124 52,124
R2 0.175 0.176 0.256 0.257
Firm FE X X X X
Destination-Year Dummies X X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard
errors for the control covariates of our model of firm’s entry and continuation
into a foreign destination (2). Estimation results for the main covariates, as
well as more details regarding the econometric model and estimation tech-
niques, are provided in the Table 7. All specifications include destination-
year dummies. All covariates, except destination-year dummies, have been
divided by their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a com-
parable metric. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses:
ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table B-25: Probability to Start and Continue Exporting
a Specific Product, controls (for Table 8)
(1) (2) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.011a 0.009a 0.076a 0.061a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.016)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.002a 0.002a 0.009 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm Age (log) -0.001 0.000 -0.011 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Exports PT 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.014)
Share of Skilled Workers 0.002b 0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
Avg. Managers’ Age -0.001b -0.001 0.002 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005)
Avg. Managers’ Education -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education -0.001b -0.001b -0.001 -0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Avg. FE Managers 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.013)
Std. Dev. FE Managers 0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.015c
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 775,675 775,675 40,125 40,125
R2 0.070 0.073 0.205 0.214
Firm FE X X X X
Product-Year FE X X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard
errors for the core covariates of our model of firm’s starting and continuing
exporting a specific product (2). Estimation results for the main covariates, as
well as more details regarding the econometric model and estimation tech-
niques, are provided in the Table 8. All specifications include product-year
dummies. All covariates, except destination-year dummies, have been di-
vided by their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable
metric. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01,
bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table B-26: (Log) Value of Exports to a Specific Desti-
nation Conditional on Entry or Continuation, controls
(for Table 9)
(1) (2) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.148 0.141 0.892a 0.875a
(0.184) (0.184) (0.069) (0.069)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.044 0.045 0.109a 0.107a
(0.055) (0.055) (0.026) (0.026)
Firm Age (log) -0.201 -0.198 -0.073c -0.069c
(0.171) (0.171) (0.042) (0.042)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) -0.006 -0.006 0.012 0.010
(0.073) (0.073) (0.024) (0.024)
Exports PT 0.128 0.128 0.043 0.041
(0.159) (0.159) (0.051) (0.051)
Share of Skilled Workers -0.009 -0.013 0.060c 0.055
(0.108) (0.108) (0.035) (0.035)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.012 0.012 -0.009 -0.004
(0.070) (0.070) (0.020) (0.020)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age -0.014 -0.015 0.000 -0.004
(0.056) (0.056) (0.013) (0.013)
Avg. Managers’ Education -0.066 -0.067 -0.004 -0.008
(0.084) (0.083) (0.024) (0.024)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education -0.075 -0.075 -0.008 -0.012
(0.051) (0.051) (0.013) (0.013)
Avg. FE Managers 0.017 0.016 -0.026 -0.024
(0.150) (0.150) (0.037) (0.037)
Std. Dev. FE Managers 0.016 0.015 0.033 0.026
(0.084) (0.083) (0.021) (0.022)
Observations 6,732 6,732 45,023 45,023
R2 0.478 0.478 0.506 0.507
Firm FE X X X X
Destination-Year Dummies X X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard
errors for the control covariates of our model of firm’s entry and con-
tinuation into a foreign destination (2). Estimation results for the main
covariates, as well as more details regarding the econometric model and
estimation techniques, are provided in the Table 9. All specifications in-
clude destination-year dummies. All covariates, except destination-year
dummies, have been divided by their respective standard deviation in order
to deliver a comparable metric. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level
in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
XVII
Table B-27: (Log) Value of Exports of a Specific Prod-
uct Conditional on Entry or Continuation, controls (for
Table 10)
(1) (2) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) -0.136 -0.159 0.352a 0.262b
(0.154) (0.153) (0.103) (0.103)
App. Labor Productivity (log) -0.120b -0.121b 0.122a 0.111a
(0.060) (0.060) (0.031) (0.030)
Firm Age (log) -0.153 -0.140 -0.109 -0.063
(0.128) (0.131) (0.127) (0.126)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) -0.000 -0.003 -0.050 -0.061c
(0.048) (0.048) (0.034) (0.034)
Exports PT 0.022 0.001 -0.043 -0.044
(0.149) (0.150) (0.095) (0.101)
Share of Skilled Workers -0.136 -0.140 -0.047 -0.072
(0.101) (0.102) (0.062) (0.065)
Avg. Managers’ Age -0.099 -0.091 -0.027 0.008
(0.068) (0.067) (0.033) (0.035)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age -0.081 -0.085c 0.029 0.015
(0.050) (0.050) (0.023) (0.024)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.004 0.018 -0.041 -0.054
(0.083) (0.083) (0.038) (0.039)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.054 0.058 -0.029 -0.044c
(0.048) (0.047) (0.022) (0.023)
Avg. FE Managers 0.126 0.116 0.036 0.059
(0.139) (0.139) (0.068) (0.068)
Std. Dev. FE Managers -0.007 0.003 0.016 -0.028
(0.077) (0.077) (0.046) (0.051)
Observations 11,853 11,853 29,033 29,033
R2 0.419 0.421 0.440 0.445
Firm FE X X X X
Product-Year Dummies X X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard
errors for the control covariates of our model of firm’s entry and continua-
tion into a foreign destination (2). Estimation results for the main covariates,
as well as more details regarding the econometric model and estimation
techniques, are provided in the Table 10. All specifications include product-
year dummies. All covariates, except destination-year dummies, have been
divided by their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a com-
parable metric. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses:
ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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Table B-28: Probability to Start Exporting in Angola;
controls (for Table 11)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 1 pse 2 pse 3 pse 4 pse
Firm Size (log) 0.019a 0.023a 0.023a 0.022b
(0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.011a 0.007c 0.007c 0.007c
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm Age (log) 0.012a 0.013b 0.012c 0.013c
(0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) -0.002c 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Exports PT -0.005a 0.029a 0.028a 0.028a
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Share of Skilled Workers -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.000 -0.004c -0.004b -0.004b
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 28,420 28,420 28,420 28,420
R2 0.024 0.383 0.384 0.384
Notes: This Table reports OLS estimator coefficients and standard errors for
the control covariates of our model of firm’s entry into a foreign destination
(2) focused on Angola. Estimation results for the main covariates, as well as
more details regarding the econometric model and estimation techniques,
are provided in the Table 11. All covariates, have been divided by their
respective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable metric. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05,
cp < 0.1.
XIX
Table B-29: Probability to Con-
tinue Exporting a Specific Product
to a Specific Destination; Interac-
tion with Chinese Import Penetra-
tion; controls (for Table 14)
(1)
Firm Size (log) 0.121a
(0.014)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.011a
(0.004)
Firm Age (log) 0.006
(0.010)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.004
(0.004)
Exports PT 0.002
(0.008)
Share of Skilled Workers 0.012c
(0.006)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.001
(0.004)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.002
(0.003)
Avg. Managers’ Education -0.001
(0.005)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education -0.002
(0.003)
Avg. FE Managers 0.000
(0.008)
Std. Dev. FE Managers 0.014a
(0.005)
Observations 1,514,409
R2 0.302
Firm FE X
Notes: This Table reports OLS estimator coef-
ficients and standard errors for the control co-
variates of an enriched version of our model
of firm’s continuation into a foreign destina-
tion (2). Estimation results for the main co-
variates, as well as more details regarding the
econometric model and estimation techniques,
are provided in the Table 14. All covariates,
except destination-year and product-year dum-
mies, have been divided by their respective
standard deviation in order to deliver a com-
parable metric. Standard errors clustered at the
firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05,
cp < 0.1.
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